Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)
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![In order to obviate these misapprehensions with respect to the sub- ject of the following work, I have thought it proper, in this preliminary chapter, first, to explain the nature of the truths which 1 propose to inves- tigate; and, secondly, to point out some of the more important applica- tions of which they are susceptible. In stating these preliminary ob- servations, I may perhaps appear to some to be minute and tedious ; but this fault, 1 am confident, will be readily pardoned by those, who have studied with care the principles of that science of which 1 am to treat; and who are anxious to remove the prejudices which have, in a great measure, excluded it from the modern systems of education. In the progress of my work, I flatter myself that I shall not often have occasion to solicit the indulgence of my readers for an unnecessary dif- fuseness. The notions we annex to the words, Matter, and Mind, as is well re- marked by Dr. Reid,* are merely relative. If I am asked, what I mean by matter? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold,—that is, I can define it in no other way, than by enumerat- ing its sensible qualities. It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by my senses: but only extension, figure, colour, and certain other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to some- thing, which is extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with respect to Mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition ; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same being; to that being, which he calls himself; a being, which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs. From these considerations, it appears, that we have the >=ame evi- dence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body ; nay if there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions : and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact woukl appear to every person, were it not, that, from our earliest years, the attention is engrossed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaint- ance with which is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our an- imal existence. Hence it is, that these phenomena occupy our thoughts more than those of mind : that we are perpetually tempted to explain the latterby the analogy of the former, and even to endeavour to refer them to the same general laws ; and that we acquire habits of inatten- tion to th«» subjects of our consciousness, too strong to be afterwards surmounted, without the most persevering industry. If the foregoing observations be well founded, they establish the dis- tinction between mind and matter, without any long process of meta- physical reasoning :t for if our notions of both are merely relative; if * Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 8.9. f See Note [A] at the end of the volume. 4](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21156645_0014.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
