Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: Elements of the philosophy of the human mind. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)
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![We suppose them to be inseparably connected. The sceptical philoso- phers, for example, of the present age have frequently attempted to hold up to ridicule these contemptible and puerile superstitions, which have disgraced the creeds of some of the most enlightened nations ; and which have not only commanded the assent, hut the reverence, of men of the most accomplished understandings- But these histories of human imbecility, are, in truth, the strongest testimonies which can be produc- ed to prove, how wonderful is the influence of the fundamental princi- ples of morality over the belief; when they are able to sanctify, in the apprehensions of mankind, every extravagant opinion, and every un- meaning ceremony, winch early education has taught us to associate with them. That impli it credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be disput- ed; but it may not, perhaps, be as generally acknowledged, that the case is the same w th unlimited scepticism : on the c-.trary, we are sometimes apt to ascribe this disposition to a more than ordinary vigour of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the history of modt-ru Europe, when reason first began to throw off lh< yoke of authority ; and when it unquestionably required a superior] y of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to resist the '-ocitagion of prevailing superstit'ori But in the present age. in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly opposite to those of the \ulgar ; the philosophical creed, or the philosophical scepti ism, of by far the greater number of those, who value themselves on an emancipation fr m popular errors, arises from the very same weakness with the credulity of the multitude : nor is it going too far to say, with Rousseau, that He, who, in the end of the eighteenth century, has brought himself to abandon all his early principles without discrimi- nation, would probably have been a bigot in the days of the League. In the midst of these contrary impulses of fashionable and of vulgar prejudices, he alone evinces the superiority and the strength of his mind, who is able to disentangle truth from error ; and to oppose the clear conclusions of his own unbiassed faculties, to the united clamours of su- perstition, and of false philosophy.—Such are the men, whom nature marks out to be the lights of the world, to fix the wavering opinions otthe multitude, and to impress their own characters on that of their age. For securing the mind completely from the weaknesses I have now been describing, and enabling it to maintain a steady course of inquiry, between implicit credulity and unlimited scepticism, the most important of all qualities is a sincere and devoted attachment to truth, which sel- dom faiis to be accompanied with a manly confidence in the clear con- clusions of human reason. It is such a confidence, united, (as it gene- rally is) with personal intrepidity, which forms what the French wri- ters call force of character ; one of the rarest endowments, it must be confessed, of our species; but which, of all endowments, is the most essential for rendering a philosopher happy in himself, and a blessing to mankind. There is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the sceptical tendency of the present age will be only a temporary evil. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature ; and, as it extends, in general, not only to religion and morality, but, In some measure, also vol. i. 4](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21156645_0029.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
