The two kinds of truth : a test of all theories with special application to those of creation, instinct, and immortality, and showing evolution to be a natural, not a universal, truth / by T.E.S.T., an old life member of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

Date:
1890
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The two kinds of truth : a test of all theories with special application to those of creation, instinct, and immortality, and showing evolution to be a natural, not a universal, truth / by T.E.S.T., an old life member of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    them to a close it seems necessary to give a short summary of the principal points in the Argument, which we have attempted to set each upon its proper pedestal of reason and deduction. I. Truth is of Two Kinds—Natural and Universal. This distinction affords a Test or Touchstone applicable to all Theories. II. Instinct is a Natural fact, mortal, and distinct in kind from Reason; whilst Mind is a Universal fact, and immortal. Consequently, Instinct and Mind are absolutely Incommen- surable, and Matter itself is not eternal. III. The Forces of Nature are not indefinitely continuous, and, if they were so, they would each ultimately prove self- destructive. Whilst the Evolution of Species may possibly be found to be true, the Evolution of Mind from Instinct, that is, of Man from the Ape, is impossible—as shown by our Test. IV. The prevalent opinion that primeval Man was a Savage is simply an assumption; and whilst our several chronologies are contradictory and untrustworthy, the glimpses which we get of the most remote antiquity generally indicate that Civilization has been alternately retrograde and progressive. “ It is an extraordinary thing that Man, with a Mind so wonderful that there is nothing to compare with it elsewhere in the known Creation, should leave it to run wild in respect of its highest elements and qualities.” Such are the words of Michael Faraday, one of the most thoughtful and cautious Philosophers of our century. If our discussions have been fairly carried out, we and our readers are free of his censure, for they have been intimately connected with these highest elements and qualities of Human Knowledge, certainly the best training for the Mind. And Pilate’s question yet remains unanswered. In a recent volume the Duke of Argyll again comes to the front in the inquiry.1 All previous definitions, such as that of Mr. G. H. Lewes, are perhaps true as far as they go, but they are more like axioms than definitions. The Duke says that Truth is both defensible and accessible. We believe this is true, but it has not yet been shown to be so, even by the pens of our most 1 “ What is Truth ?” by the Duke of Argyll, K.T., 1889.