Licence: In copyright
Credit: Attention / by W.B. Pillsbury. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Leeds Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Leeds Library.
308/372 page 292
![To attempt any explanation beyond this is to indulge in speculation, and in almost every case it would be more satisfactory to admit ignorance in the beginning. The fifth and last theory of attention which we must con- sider is represented by Kohn [4], and is to the effect that attention and consciousness are identical. This is not far different from the conclusion that we have reached, in so far as it must be admitted that attention is involved in all consciousness, and that degree of attention and degree of consciousness amount to the same thing. This seems to be the main point upon which Kohn insists. If he means, however, to do away with the word attention we should be compelled to take issue with him. There are peculiar concomitant phenomena of the attention process, strain sensations, feeling of interest, etc., which are definitely marked off from the other conscious process and are bound to receive a distinctive name. We might agree that atten- tion is consciousness regarded from one aspect, but as there are other aspects the name must be retained to avoid con- fusion. It is as important that the different points of view from which consciousness is regarded should have names that will enable us to distinguish them, as it is that the different states themselves should be distinguished. We may say then, in conclusion of our examination of the various theories of attention from the side of conscious- ness, that each has picked out some more or less important concomitant process or some aspect of attention and re- garded it as the explanation of all the remaining parts or aspects. Attention is always accompanied by movements that result from attention. These Ribot has emphasised and made the cause or condition of attention. Attention is followed by interest, and this fact Stumpf has made central and a cause. Frequently, feeling precedes or accom- panies attention. Horwicz has generalised this fact to make of it a cause. Attention involves clear and distinct ideas, and sometimes results from the intensity of the external stimulus ; Mill assumed that attention always depended](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21523630_0308.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
