Volume 1

Taylor's principles and practice of medical jurisprudence / [Alfred Swaine Taylor].

  • Alfred Swaine Taylor
Date:
1920
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Taylor's principles and practice of medical jurisprudence / [Alfred Swaine Taylor]. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    903/962 (page 885)
    The doctrine of “ irresistible impulse,55 and the theory of impulsive insanity have been strained to such a degree as to create in the public mind a distrust of medical evidence on these occasions. It is easy to convert this into a plea for the extenuation of all kinds of crimes for which motives are not apparent, and thus medical witnesses expose themselves to rebuke. They are certainly not justified in setting up such a defence, unless they are prepared to draw a clear distinction between impulses which are “ unresisted ” and those which are irresistible. In the case of R. v. Allnutt, the prisoner, a boy aged twelve, was convicted of poisoning his grandfather, under circum¬ stances indicative of sane contrivance and deliberation. The medicaJ evidence entirely failed to show that the prisoner was or ever had been insane in a legal sense. The remarks made by Rolfe, B., who tried the case, are of importance :— “ The witnesses called for the defence had described the prisoner as acting from uncontrollable impulse, and they had made other statements, of the value of which it would be for the jury to decide ; but he must say that it was his opinion that such evidence ought to be scanned by juries with very great jealousy and suspicion, because it might tend to the justification of every crime that was com¬ mitted. What was the meaning of not being able to resist an impulse ? Every crime was committed under an impulse, and the object of the law was to compel persons to control or resist these impulses. If it was made an excuse for a person who had committed a crime, that he had been goaded to it by some impulse which medical men might choose to say he could not control, such a doctrine would be fraught with very great danger to society.” In 1872 (R. v. Jordan) the prisoner was indicted for the murder of a child, whose throat he deliberately cut. There was no motive; he had previously borne an excellent character, and was very fond of children, and there was no evidence of mental disorder or intellectual insanity. His wife had deserted him some time before, and he had fallen into a state of great depression. Martin, B., is reported to have said :— Under such circumstances it was for the jury to consider whether it would be safe to convict the prisoner of murder. When such impulses came upon men, according to the medical evidence they were unable to resist them. It would be safe in such a case to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity. Acquitted. In R. v. Prince the motive seems to have been simply that of revenge for fancied neglect, a motive very powerful with reckless sane people, and yet the prisoner was declared to be insane. For the following analysis of this gross miscarriage of justice, the editor is indebted to Mr. Stanley B. Atkinson. R. v. R. A. Prince.—References, 1897, Times, 17th December (p. 11), re Murder; Times, 21st December (p. 7), re Inquest; 1898, Times, 14th January (p. 5), re Trial. . Inquest on William “ Terriss ” Lewin, before Mr. John Troutbeck, 20th December, 1897, verdict, wilful murder by the man Prince. [Punctured right ventricle, cause of death.] Mental condition of assailant not for coroner’s jury to consider. Trial.—R. v. Prince, C. C. C., January 13th, 1898, before Channell, J. (1) Three members of his family mentally weak. (2) Prince had been “ mentally deranged from infancy, in manhood diseased