Born to crime : the genetic causes of criminal behavior / Lawrence Taylor.

  • Taylor, Lawrence, 1942-
Date:
1984
Catalogue details

Licence: Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

Credit: Born to crime : the genetic causes of criminal behavior / Lawrence Taylor. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    12 Born to Crime proaches to punishment of criminal behavior. Certainly, along with rehabilitation, it is held up by experts as the primary jus¬ tification for punishing. Yet there is considerable evidence that this theory is ineffective as it applies to the hard-core recidivist. The statistics on repeat offenders clearly indicate that deter¬ rence—at least specific deterrence—is ineffective: If punishment deters the individual from committing further criminal acts, why is our rate of recidivism so terribly high? Why is one who has already been punished so much more likely to commit an of¬ fense again? The deterrent theory is based upon the economic model pro¬ pounded in a previous century by Jeremy Bentham: It assumes a perfectly hedonistic, perfectly rational actor whose object it is to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. To such an actor con¬ templating the possibility of a criminal act the decision is based on a calculus: How much do I stand to gain by doing it? How much do I stand to lose if I am caught doing it? What are the chances of my getting away with it? What is the balance of gain and loss as dis¬ counted by the chance of apprehension? More recently, Bentham's aged concepts have been modernized and applied to our system of criminal justice in the form of the widely accepted Becker-Ehrlich model: Criminals maximize their expected gains [according to some utility functions] from illicit activity. A person commits an offense if the ex¬ pected utility he will receive exceeds the utility he would receive by engaging in other activities. Thus the criminal's decision is based on benefits and costs of both a monetary and psychic nature. . . . An increase in the probability of apprehension and punishment, with no change in other variables, reduces the incentive to participate in ille¬ gitimate activities.^ Yet as many critics have pointed out, this assumption is unreal¬ istic. Criminals do not, in fact, pause to reflect upon the possi¬ ble punishments for their conduct. There is usually little, if any, calm and rational weighing of alternatives and consequences. Perhaps the most often cited example is that of public hangings in Great Britain. Despite the obvious general deterrent purposes