The physical and metaphysical works of Lord Bacon : including the Advancement of learning and Novum organum / edited by Joseph Devey.

  • Francis Bacon
Date:
1886
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The physical and metaphysical works of Lord Bacon : including the Advancement of learning and Novum organum / edited by Joseph Devey. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    154/608 (page 142)
    in his stead; and, at the same time, receiving final causes through his affection to logic, not theology. These final causes, however, are not false, or unworthy of inquiry in metaphysics, but their excursion into the limits of physical causes hath made a great devastation in that pro- vince ; otherwise, when contained within their own bounds, Spinozist principle which the text attributes to the Stagyrite has been understood by many critics oi the sensational school to intimate that Aristotle was of their way of thinking, though the idea of an independent material intelligence is expressly contradicted by numerous passages in his Metaphysics. In book xii. chap. 5, of the works which go under this name, the principal being is held to exclude the idea of matter from his nature: en roivvv ravrag Stl ovaiag tlvai avtv vArjg' aiSiovg yap StV k.t.X.; and (ibid. 8) to St n r/v tlvai ovk ixti v\i)v to npuiTov tvTtAkxna yap. In chap. 7 he affirms this principle to be spirit,—dpy/j »/ voprrtg■ that matter cannot move of itself, but needs the action of an exterior agent,—ou yap t) yt vkr) Kivpaei ai)Tr) iavTrjv, a\\a tiktoviky]' and that this principle must be eternal and active,—’AiSiov tcai o b-jia Kai ivkpytia oiicra. Aristotle further proceeds to show that all other beings are only a species of means transmitting the motion to others which have been communicated to them, but that this primary being, possessing the spring of motion in itself, moves without being moved; illustrating this kind of action by the emotions and deeds that spring from the love, pity, or hatred that agents at rest excite in others. In another place he affirms that this being is not only eternal in duration but immutable in essence, and quite distinct from sensible things: ort yap taTiv ovaia rig atdiog Kai aKivtjTog Kai KtxoJpiapivrj riov aiadriTuiv, tpavtpbv tic tuiv tiprjptvwv' and that heaven and nature hang upon its behests,—ek TOiavTrjg apa apxnQ r'lpTriTai 6 ovpavbg Kai p <pv<ng. He further shows that life belongs to it by essence, and as the action of intelligence is life, and vice versd, essential action constitutes the eternal life of this being. Aristotle then calls this independent principle Goa, and assigns to it endless duration: tyapiv oi tov GEO'N tlvai Zwov dioiov apioTov. “It remains,” says the Stagyrite, “to determine whether this principle be one or several; but upon this point we need only remember that those who have decided for a plurality have advanced nothing worthy of consideration in support of their belief.”—'AAAi ptpvijadai Kai rag tuiv aAAiov cnro<f>datig on tttpi -xApdovg ovdi tipr)- Kaaiv o n Kai rrarpeg tiirtiv. (Ibid. chap. 8.) “For the principle of exist- ence, or the immovable being which is the source of all movement, being pure action, and consequently foreign to matter, is one in reason and number .... all the rest is the creation of a mythology invented by politicians to advance the public interest and occupy the attention of mankind.” To Si ti f/v tlvai ovk t%ti vApv to Ttp&Tov' tvrtAixtia yap. (Supp. note 1.) Ei> piv apa Kai Aoyip Kai apiQpip to 7rp<Sroj/ kivovv aKivr)Tov. (Ibid. chap. 8.) Ta St Aoiira pvOiKwg ricp npoai)x^V irpog rr/v Tnidu) tCjv -KoWijiv Kai Tzpbg rrjv tig rovg vopovg Kai to ovpipepov Xpijaiv. (Ibid.) Ed.