The psychology of memory and recollection : read to the Psychological Society of Great Britain, June 1st, 1876 / by Mr. Serjeant Cox.

  • Edward William Cox
Date:
1876
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The psychology of memory and recollection : read to the Psychological Society of Great Britain, June 1st, 1876 / by Mr. Serjeant Cox. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    define what that something is. As yet it can offer nothing beyond conjecture. But it asserts confidently that it is not of molecular structure. Therefore it is imperceptible to the senses, which are constructed to perceive only the structure that is molecular. Psychology does not call this something Soul, or Spirit, because these are misleading names, which have been so used that different ideas are attached to them by different persons and having no common definition. But Psychology reasonably suggests that this Something, the evidence of whose being is so cogent, is probably constructed of some combination of particles other than that which makes molecules (the molecule being the ultimate particle of matter perceptible by the senses). Hence it is that our senses have no perception of that something, and that its existence can be proved only by its action upon the molecular structure our senses can per- ceive. We find Something that is imperceptible to our senses setting this perceptible molecular mechanism in motion, and directing its motions by intelligence, and having- consciousness of individuality and a will to do or not to do, and ideas, thoughts, emotions. Although no sense can show us that Something in form, we have no more reason to question its existence, as proved by its actions, than to question the existence of magnetism, which is imperceptible to us, and which we know only through its action upon the molecular substances our senses are constructed to perceive. I repeat, that we contend only for the existence of this Something which constitutes the Conscious Self—the indi- vidual Man. But of what this Something is composed, in what manner it is united with the material mechanism, by what process it moves and directs the machinery, how the impressions made on the material brain are communicated to it, and how it conveys its Will to the mechanism, are problems as yet unsolved, which hitherto have received very [135]