Outlines of moral philosophy / by Dugald Stewart.

  • Dugald Stewart
Date:
1845
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Outlines of moral philosophy / by Dugald Stewart. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    conduct the mind by a series of consequences, from premises to a conclusion ? 74. “When the mind,” says Locke, “ per- ceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other, its knowledge may be called intuctive. When it cannot so bring its 7deas together, as by their immediate com- parison, and, as it were, juxtaposition, or appli- cation one to another, to perceive their agree- ment or disagreement, it is fain, by the inter- vention of other ideas, (one, or more, as it hap- pens), to discover the agreement or disagree- ment which it searches; and this is what we eall Reasoning.” According to these detini- tions ; supposing the equality of two lines A and B to be perceived immediately, in conse- quence of their coincidence; the judgment of the mind isintuitive. Supposing A to coincide with B, and B with C; the relation between A and C is perceived by Reasoning. 75. This is certainly not agreeable to com- mon language. The truth of mathematical axioms has always been supposed to be intui- tively obvious ; and the first of these, according to Euclid’s enumeration, affirms; that if A be equal to C, and B to C; A and C are equal. 76. Admitting, however, Locke’s definition to be just, it might easily be shewn, that the fa-
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