Select discourses on the functions of the nervous system : in opposition to phrenology, materialism, and atheism : to which is prefixed a lecture on the diversities of the human character arising from physiological peculiarities / by John Augustine Smith.

  • Smith, John Augustine, 1782-1865.
Date:
1840
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Select discourses on the functions of the nervous system : in opposition to phrenology, materialism, and atheism : to which is prefixed a lecture on the diversities of the human character arising from physiological peculiarities / by John Augustine Smith. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)

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    analysis of the whole subject is required. In this accordingly I propose to engage. And I shall do so in the perfect confidence, that the premises of our adversaries, as understood, and employed by them, will be found as false, in point of fact, as any inference they can furnish, touching the topic under discussion, is ne- cessarily illegitimate, and unfounded. For the more ready attainment of our object, it may be well to state, in plain terms, the problem really to be solved. It is as follows : Does more than the single, solitary element, matter, enter into the composition of man ? Thus expressed, the affirmative can be proved, on the implied admission, that one ingredient at least, is required for the formation of a human being. The nature of that one, if there be no other, will be incidentally demonstrated, as we proceed, but the truth especially to be established is, that more than the single, solitary element, matter, does enter into the composition of man. To sustain this proposition, in the mode proposed, the declaration, we feel matter, and the inference there- from—« therefore, we know it exists, have to be dis- posed of. The one, and the other—the premise, and the deduction—are both denied, and I undertake to prove that no Materialist ever did feel matter, or ever can know that it exists. Having thus thrown down the gauntlet, in the broadest, and strongest terms, nothing remains but to arrange the conditions of the battle, that is, to state, by way of pre- face, the requisite definitions. Now the contest has to turn'upon the words feel and know, of these, there- 14*