The psychology of reasoning / by W.B. Pillsbury.

  • Walter Bowers Pillsbury
Date:
1910
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The psychology of reasoning / by W.B. Pillsbury. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    a matter of course. It is asserted by some re- ligious cults that certain forms of belief can and should be aroused at will. This is not far from the doctrine that Professor James holds in his ‘6Will to Believe.” From the point of view we have reached, it would be just as absurd to exhort anyone to change his belief without new evidence or new interpretation of old evidence as it would to exhort him to hasten his pulse, or to increase his stature. Even if he endeav- ored to comply, the most that could result would be a pretense before the world, in which there would be neither practical efficiency nor any great virtue. And as a matter of fact will and belief are undoubtedly common products of the same deeper lying forces. Whatever appeals to us strongly enough to tempt us to desire to be- lieve, by the very same appeal compels belief. The only exceptions are found where social re- wards come from pretending to believe. And in these cases we probably should be able to carry on the pretense without belief, but it is a ques- tion how long it would be before pretense gave belief. It is as necessary to believe to will as it is to will to believe; indeed, the former is the normal and usual order. In this discussion as throughout I have paid
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