An examination and popular exposition of the hylo-idealistic philosophy / by William Bell M'Taggart.

  • M'Taggart, William Bell, -1919.
Date:
[1884?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An examination and popular exposition of the hylo-idealistic philosophy / by William Bell M'Taggart. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    however, by those who long for a future state : ^ How do you know that, when we die, a material eidolon, as it were, is not given off from our bodies, and in new com- binations with more refined states of matter does not continue the identity—nay, even the appearance—of the individual? You cannot show that only the organism of the brain produces thought. May not more subtle com- binations of matter produce even greater results?’ The answer to this is, that here you leave all groundwork of experience and evidence, and wander into conjecture. We have no evidence whatever either for or against; therefore, there is at least no presumption in its favour; negatively, the presumption is the other way. It is out- side of the domain of science, which deals only with evidence, and must be relegated to the domain of faith— faith being defined as ‘ the evidence of things not seen.’ Taking ‘ seen ’ as it should be taken—in its widest sense— it may be paraphrased as follows :—‘ Faith is the evidence of things of which there is no evidence.’ When evidence on the subject is produced, then it will enter the domain of observation and verification (science). Till then, as ‘Julian’ rightly says, Hylo-Idealism declines to wander in the region of vain conjecture. In article 6 ‘ Julian ’ proceeds :— ‘As spirit, presuming there is such a thing, is im- ponderable, its action on matter is impossible (two assertions about the unknown). The action of light, heat, and electricity—all imponderables—on matter is not to the point, as all these things are material forces, and have no existence per se or apart from matter. [These are also assertions, which, however, are more or less justified by the present state of our knowledge.] Only matter, or the forces of matter, can act on matter [another question- begging assertion]; and if there be such a thing as immaterial spirit, it can act only on immaterial spirit [again the petitio principii\ Ex nihilo nihil fit: from