An examination and popular exposition of the hylo-idealistic philosophy / by William Bell M'Taggart.

  • M'Taggart, William Bell, -1919.
Date:
[1884?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An examination and popular exposition of the hylo-idealistic philosophy / by William Bell M'Taggart. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The Royal College of Surgeons of England. The original may be consulted at The Royal College of Surgeons of England.

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    all things, but not in proportion to them; therefore, exactly the contrary of this statement is true, and every- thing that man thinks and feels and does, he does only through and by his relation to the absolute. In article 8 ^Julian ’ says :— ^Man can in no wise step beyond himself. He can cognise nothing beyond that limit. He can never even think beyond it. [This is, as we have seen, soundly established upon the principles of Hylo-Idealism.] Hence he cannot even think of annihilation or of pure spirits without parts, without form, without succession in time.’ This is Hylo-Idealism phcs ‘ Julian.’ It might be main- tained that man does think about these things, otherwise ‘ Julian ’ would not have written about them; and I think it is a fair corollary to the Hylo-Idealistic theory that man can and does think about these things, because he is in relation with them, and that they are, therefore, part of his own egoity. Article 9 runs thus :— ‘If man can never escape from his own egoity, it follows as a thing of course that what in regard to himself is called the “external universe” is part of his egoity, other- wise he would cognise beyond himself. [Extend the external universe to its proper scope, and let it include the spirit or absolute, and this contention becomes thoroughly sound.] If there is a world isolated from man, absolute and not relative, man can know nothing about it, because it is beyond him; it is out of the pale of his cognisance, it is cut off from him, it is unknowable and unthinkable, for man can only know and think as far as he can know and think, and this limit must be himself.’ Certainly, if there is a world (of spirit) wholly isolated from man, man can know nothing about it; but if^ as I have endeavoured to show, the absolute is, in reality, also relative, then man’s mental range and dignity is, I venture