A new theory of vision : and other writings / [George] Berkeley ; introduction by A. D. Linsay.

  • George Berkeley
Date:
[1910]
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Credit: A new theory of vision : and other writings / [George] Berkeley ; introduction by A. D. Linsay. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by UCL Library Services. The original may be consulted at UCL (University College London)

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    scepticism about the nature of the soul. [It is even probable, that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some, whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it.] That an idea, which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems no need to other refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by those words. [But perhaps you will say, that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit, in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects: and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original.] CXXXVIII. [/ answer, if it does not in those men- tioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there rem.ains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit.] For by the word spi7'it we mean only that which thinks, wills, and per- ceives ; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If, therefore, it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit. CXXXIX. [But it will be objected, (2)1 that if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and sub- stance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is neither an idea nor hke an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.] What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word, and that since the immediate significations of other names are, by common consent, called ideas, no reason can be assigned, why that which is signified by the name spif'it or soul, may not partake in the same appellation. [I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree, in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived: whereas a soul or