Philosophy : its scope and relations an introductory course of lectures / by Henry Sidgwick.

  • Henry Sidgwick
Date:
1902
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Philosophy : its scope and relations an introductory course of lectures / by Henry Sidgwick. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    261/280 page 237
    To this I answer that End as a biological or socio- logical notion may, no doubt, be held convertible for practical purposes with ethical end, but that this can only be by an ethical judgment affirming the coincidence of the two: the two notions remain essentially distinct, though when affirmed to be coincident they are doubtless liable to be confused. From the mere knowledge that a certain result is what will be or preponderantly tends to be, it is im- possible to infer that it ought to be. So far as it is inevitable, I obviously can have no duty with regard to it; so far as its coming may be promoted or retarded, it is my duty to promote it if I judge it good in comparison with that for which it would be substituted, and to retard it if I judge it to be com- paratively bad. Perhaps I may suggest that this distinction between the two is often not clearly recognised, because in the terms, such as ‘ social welfare ’ or ‘ social health,’ used to denote the socio- logical end, the ethical notion is surreptitiously introduced; they are states which have been im- plicitly judged to be good. And similarly we shall judge institutions and practices that cause misery now as bad on that ground, and not merely because they are not in the shortest line of progress to the future of humanity in which there will be—as Mr. Spencer seems to be convinced—“ pleasure unalloyed by pain anywhere.” ^ § 3. This leads me to another mode of establishing coherence between systematic thought about ‘what 1 [Cf. above, p. 189.]
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