Philosophy : its scope and relations an introductory course of lectures / by Henry Sidgwick.

  • Henry Sidgwick
Date:
1902
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Licence: In copyright

Credit: Philosophy : its scope and relations an introductory course of lectures / by Henry Sidgwick. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    whole knowalhe universe may, no less than the study of any special science, be regarded as a particular kind of rational activity, which has to be compared and co-ordinated with other modes of human life and action ; from this point of view we consider how far such knowledge is an end in itself and how far a means to some further end, and how large a place the pursuit of it ought to occupy in the right organisation of human existence,—all which questions manifestly come within the scope assigned to Practical Philosophy. I may illustrate this by answering the objection made by Sir W. Hamilton ^ to the distinction which I have adopted between Theoretical Philosophy and Practical Philosophy. He says that all Philosophy is in a sense theoretical, because it is cognitive, while again all Philosophy is in a sense practical, because its end is the ‘ practical energy ’ exercised in the process of cognition. I answer by agreeing that in my con- ception of Practical Philosophy, I extend the notion of Practice, beyond what is customary, to include all forms of human activity—as Hamilton himself does in speaking of practical energy exercised in cognition. And thus Theoretical Philosophy is no doubt in a sense practical, because it is a department of human activity, but in this aspect it is not to be identified with Practical Philosophy, but to be subordinated to it. The question : What is the utility of (Theoretical) Philosophy, what is the ultimate end for w^hich we 1 Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 113.
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