A treatise on medical jurisprudence / by Francis Wharton and Moreton Stillé ; the medical part revised and corrected, with numerous additions by Alfred Stillé.

  • Francis Wharton
Date:
1860
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A treatise on medical jurisprudence / by Francis Wharton and Moreton Stillé ; the medical part revised and corrected, with numerous additions by Alfred Stillé. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)

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    (c.) The better opinion lias been that witnesses, who are not experts, who have for a given time had the opportunity of observing the patient, may be asked their opinion as to his sanity, (.s) Such witnesses cannot, of course, be asked his opinion as to the character of such facts. The same is true in regard to any question of science, because persons conversant with such science have peculiar means, from a larger and more exact observation, and long experience in such department of science, of drawing correct inferences from certain facts, either observed by themselves or testified to by other witnesses. A familiar instance of the application of this prin- ciple occurs very often in cases of homicide, when, upon certain facts being testified to by other witnesses, medical persons are asked whether in their opinion a particular wound described would be an adequate cause, or whether such wound was, in their opinion, the actual cause of death, in the particular case. Such question is commonly asked without objection; and the judicial proof of the fact of killing often depends wholly or mainly upon such testing of opinion. It is upon this ground that the opinion of witnesses who have long been conversant with insanity in its various forms, and who have had the care and superintendence of insane persons, are received as compe- tent evidence, even though they have not had opportunity to examine the particular patient, and observe the symptoms and indications of disease at the time of its sup- posed existence. It is designed to aid the judgment of the jury in regard to the influence and effect of certain facts which lie out of the observation and experience of persons in general. And such opinions, when they come from persons of great experience, and in whose correctness and sobriety of judgment just confidence can be had, are of great weight, and deserve the respectful consideration of a jury. But the opinion of a medical man of small experience, or of one who has crude and visionary notions, or who has some favorite theory to support, is entitled to very little consider- ation. The value of such testimony will depend mainly upon the experience, fidelity, and impartiality of the witness who gives it. One caution in regard to this point it is proper to give. Even where the medical or other professional witnesses have attended the whole trial, and heard the testimony of the other witnesses as to the facts and circumstances of the case, they are not to judge of the credit of the witnesses, or of the truth of the facts testified to by others. It is for the jury to decide whether such facts are satisfactorily proved. And the proper question to be put to the professional witnesses is this : If the symptoms and indica- tions testified to by the other witnesses are proved, and if the jury are satisfied of the truth of them, whether in their opinion the party was insane, and what was the nature and character of that insanity; what state of mind did they indicate ; and what they would expect would be the conduct of such a person in any supposed circumstances. See 1 M. & Rob. 75 ; Com. v. Rodgers, 7 Mete. 5 ; Elwell's Malpractice and Medical Evidence, p. 310. On a trial for murder a medical witness testified that he saw defendant on the evening of the day after the killing, conversed with him, and then thought him deranged ; that he thought the insanity was delirium tremens; that he knew defendant's habits of drinking, and supposed drinking to be the cause of his insanity; that he had been present and heard all the evidence. The witness then stated, under objection, how long he thought defendant had been in this state of delirium, but was not allowed to state whether, in his opinion, he was in this state on the night of the alleged killing. It was held that this was no error. People v. McCauu, 3 Parker, C. R. (N. Y.) 272. (s) Clary v. Clary, 2 Iredell, 78; Clark v. State, 13 Ohio, 483 ; Grant v. Thompson, 4 Connec. 203 ; Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. C. R. 580 ; Rambler v. Tryon, 7 S. & R. 90; Wogan v. Small, 11 S. & R. 141 ; Morse r. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499 ; Lester v. Pitts- ford, 7 Vt, 158 ; Gibson r. Gibson, 9 Yerger, 329 ; Potts v. House, 6 Georg. 324 ; Colver v. Haslam, 7 Barbour, 374, which case, however, was recorded in Dewitt v. Barley, 5 Selden, 371 ; Baldwin r. State, 12 Missouri, 223 ; De Whitt v. Barley, 13 Barbour, 550 ; Kinne v. Kinne, 9 Conn. 102; Norris v. State, 16 Alab. 776; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 3 Hagg. 574; and see 7 Bost. Law Rep. (N. S.) 696, where these cases are cited. The opinions of witnesses, not medical men, or experts, and not the subscribing wit- nesses to a will, cannot be given on the question of tbe sanity of the testator. [Demo, Willaed, and Moore, JJ., dissenting.] Dewitt v. Barley, 5 Selden (N. Y.), 371. It is said, however, that the opinion of a witness, acquainted with the person whose capa- city is in question, and founded on his own observation, is admissible on the question of sanity or insanity; certainly if the facts on which his opinion rests are also stated. [Per Denio, J.] Dewitt v. Barley, 5 Selden (N. Y.) 371. In Maryland, a witness familiar with the grantor in a deed for a long time, both before and after its execution, may,after testifying to the grantor's state of mind before its execution, be further examined as to acts of insanity subsequent to that period. Negro Jerry v. Townshend, 9 Md. 145.
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