Volume 1
The tobacco industry and the health risks of smoking : second report / Health Committee.
- Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Health Committee
- Date:
- 2000
Licence: Open Government Licence
Credit: The tobacco industry and the health risks of smoking : second report / Health Committee. Source: Wellcome Collection.
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![example, in comparison with a standard reference cigarette, Accord provides significant reductions in carbon monoxide, aromatic amines, benzene and polyaromatic hydrocarbons”.?*° 140. Unfortunately, the commercial precedents for such innovative cigarettes are not promising. For example, R J Reynolds launched Premier in the US, as a “new technology” cigarette, which heated rather than burned tobacco. However, their evidence stated that “consumers did not respond favourably to the product in trials in the US and Premier was consequently not put onto the UK market.” Two other similarly innovative products failed market research tests. R J Reynolds stated that “a major contributory factor to the failure of the products described.... was [RJR’s] inability to communicate the products’ potential benefits to consumers”.”*! 141. Gallaher told the Committee that “in July 1977, [it] launched four cigarette brands containing a substitute material named Cytrel. None of these brands....were commercially successful”. It suggested that the reasons for this failure were: “(a) the word ‘substitute’ had to be printed on the packet; (b) the product was taxed at the same level as cigarettes containing no substitute materials... (c) The Health Education Council [the predecessor of the HEA]...undermined the product by advertising against it.”?“ 142. Imperial’s evidence stated that in the 1960s it started developing an unflavoured, nicotine-free smoking material known as NSM. In 1977 it launched six brands of cigarettes containing 25% NSM and 75% natural tobacco. However, it said that there was a lack of consumer demand and that the brands’ failure could be attributed to: the Government’s refusal to reduce levies on NSM products in relation to conventional cigarettes; adverse effects as a result of Government sponsored campaigns; and the fact that “cigarette smokers preferred conventional cigarettes”.”* 143. The reasons given by the tobacco companies for the failure of such “safer” products were in contrast to those suggested by ASH and the RCN. Their evidence stated that “the annual smoking death toll could be significantly reduced if cigarette manufacturers used their vast and detailed knowledge of the design and processes involved in the manufacture of their product to reduce its toxicity and carcinogenicity”. As evidence for this they referred to 57 patents taken out by tobacco companies which, they argued, could reduce the hazardous chemicals in cigarette smoke. They gave four reasons why they believed companies had not produced ‘safer’ products: legal (such a move would be an admission that other products were unsafe); marketing (a safe product might make the unsafe equivalent unappealing); economic (the costs of producing and marketing a new product); and regulatory (by showing that certain chemicals could be controlled, the companies might be inviting regulatory ‘intrusion’ which could force change).”” 144. The contrasting reasons put forward for the failure - so far - of ‘safer’ cigarettes raises the issue of whether companies should be able to work in a ‘looser’ regulatory environment for such goods, for example, in terms of the claims used when marketing them. The RCP’s report recognised the complexities of the situation: “Were these products to be marketed with promises, direct or implied, of substantially reduced risk to health, sales might be expected to rise substantially... However, these novel nicotine delivery devices raise a number of regulatory concerns. One important question is whether the products have less toxicity than conventional products..... More difficult to answer, though, is the nature and extent of any long-term problems. Chronic toxicity may not be revealed in short-term tests, and products such as these could conceivably - as with ‘light’ cigarettes - make the problem worse”.”*° The Secretary of State also recognised the problem of needing a long-term assessment of the impact of particular types of cigarettes.*”” 145. The RCP also stated that consideration would have to be given to the regulation of ‘safer’ cigarettes alongside that of medicinal forms of nicotine because of the interrelated issues. The report concluded that one approach “might be to grant preliminary approval for marketing of products such as these, based on a range of information and assurances from the manufacturers. Post-marketing 240 Fy, p.230. 24l Ey. pp.235-36. 242 by, p.178. 243 Ry., p.213. 2M4EV p65. 45 By. .65. 246 Nicotine Addiction in Britain, pp.172-73. 24791399.](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b32221083_0001_0053.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
