Introduction to physiological psychology / by Theodor Ziehen ; translated by C.C. van Liew and Otto W. Beyer.

  • Theodor Ziehen
Date:
1909
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Licence: In copyright

Credit: Introduction to physiological psychology / by Theodor Ziehen ; translated by C.C. van Liew and Otto W. Beyer. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    and (2) a psychical property, as memory, for example, to their molecules, in that it merely creates a formal logical unity for the two separate series. But these undemonstrated hypotheses do not give us any insight whatever into the connection that exists between the two series. Another variety of the monistic theory likewise accepts the two series as co-ordinated, but attempts to remove their difference by more or less sophistical arguments. The two series are supposed to be originally and properly identical “ in the absolute,” and to have become differentiated only by a “ disunion of the absolute.” The metaphysical histories of creation, found in the “ philosophy of identism,” or the “doctrine of identity,” belong to this class of theories.1 The last of the monistic views may be designated as the critical. It is the only one that remains within the bounds of empirical psychology as a natural science. This critical view does not accept the two series without further test; on the contrary, it investigates the manner in which we have come psychologically to assume the existence of two series and endeavours to deter- mine whether the material and psychical data are equally primary or not. Such a critical test demonstrates quite irrefutably that our first data are only those contained in thzpsychical series of phenomena.2 We shall now discuss somewhat more thoroughly this last and most important proposition of empirical psychology, a proposition that is too easily ignored, especially on the part of the natural sciences. We first became familiar with reflex and automatic acts. Neither is accompanied by a psychical process. Such a process 1 The view also entertained by many modern psychologists that matter is that viewed from without which the psychical is viewed from within (Hoffding’s “ Hypothesis of Identity ”) is not much more than a play of words. One might fitly ask to what observer or the observed belong. 2 Hiat strictly speaking only the psychical series of one individual is primarily given, may here be disregarded. The exclusive consideration of this fact leads to so-called solipsism or egoism in epistemology. Comp. v. SCHUBERT-SoLDliRN, “ H.impf nm die Transcendenz.” ELTHAM | I PUBLIC LIBRARY. ]