Redgrave's Factories Acts / by Alexander Redgrave.

  • United Kingdom
Date:
1931
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Redgrave's Factories Acts / by Alexander Redgrave. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    62/842 page 28
    fact that the injury was idgditentaly caused through carelessness and wilful disobedience to the foreman’s orders on the part of the injured person. If it is so fenced as to be safe when the machine is working forwards, and dangerous when working backwards, an offence is committed whenever the machinery is reversed (Pursell v. Clement Talbot, Limited (1914), 79 J. P. 1; 111 L. T. 827 (C. A.) ). And ‘the obligation to fence is absolute. It is an obligation not merely to fence but to fence securely. The statute does not say that dangerous machinery shall be fenced if that is commercially practicable or mechanically possible. . If a machine cannot be securely fenced while remaining commercially practicable or mechanically useful the statute in effect prohibits its use” (per SALTER, J., in Davies v. Thomas Owen & Co. Limited, [1919] 2 K. B. 39; 83. J. P..193; 88.L. J. K. B. 887 3 121-L. T. 156; 17 ia G. BR. 407). Further, in Menzies v. Wm. Prewett (Exors. of ) K. B. May 2nd, 1928 (unreported), see 92 J. P. 520, it was held that the provision of a loose cover for a dough mixer, coupled with warnings against using the machine without the cover, was not secure fencing, and that if a safety lid had been provided it would have restricted the opening and rendered the insertion of a worker's hand more difficult and an accident unlikely. (¢) Dangerous Machinery.—Bys. 156 theexpression ‘‘ machinery” is defined as including every driving strap or band. The words “all dangerous parts of the machinery,’ which were added by the Act of 1891, are important. Before the Act of 1891 there was an absolute obligation to fence only in the case of mill- gearing, 7.¢., the portion of the machinery by which power was transmitted, while with regard to the rest of the machinery if the inspector notified any part of it to be dangerous and the occupier disputed his decision, the question whether it was dangerous or not was to be determined by arbitration. Now the obligation to fence extends to all dangerous machinery. See Redgrave v. Lloyd, [1895] 1 Q. B. 876; 59 J. P. 293; 64 L. J. M. C. 155; 72 L. T. 565; 43 W. R. 527 ; 18 Cox C. C. 149, in which the word ‘* machinery % used here was held to include all the operative machinery in a factory, and not only machinery ejusdem generis with mill-gearing. The question whether machinery is dangerous or not is a question of fact for the magistrate to determine in each case. In Hindle v. Birtwistle, [1897] 1 Q. B. 192; 61 J. P. 70; 66 LJ. Q. B. 178; 76 LOT. 1603 46 WR. 200 18 Com CoC. 50s, it was held that the enactment applies to all machinery from which, in the ordinary course of working it, danger may reasonably be anticipated, although such danger may arise by reason only of careless working or of external causes. This decision was followed in the Scotch case of Fotheringham v. Babcock & Wilcox, Ld., [1922] S. Cad.) 60; It may be observed that paragraph (c) differs slightly from its two predecessors, (a) and (b), in that the machinery of the kind described in (c) need not be fenced if it is as safe as it would be if
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