A consideration of the legal aspects of chiropractic : and more particularly of the question whether or not chiropractic is included within the terms of the Michigan Medical Act-Act. No. 237, Public Laws of 1899, as amended-and is subject to the provisions of that act. Brief, argument and authorities for the affirmative / by Loesch, Scofield & Loesch, Counsel for American Medical Association.
- Loesch, Scofield & Loesch, Chicago.
- Date:
- [1911]
Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: A consideration of the legal aspects of chiropractic : and more particularly of the question whether or not chiropractic is included within the terms of the Michigan Medical Act-Act. No. 237, Public Laws of 1899, as amended-and is subject to the provisions of that act. Brief, argument and authorities for the affirmative / by Loesch, Scofield & Loesch, Counsel for American Medical Association. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School.
78/94 page 70
![Jones V. People, for use, etc. (1899), 84 111. App., 453—another case of a drugless treatment by rubbing, etc. Both of these are in line with the principles enunciated in the* foregoing cases. We purposely omit citing as authority People y. Gordon (1902), 194 111., 560; 62 N. E., 858, a later Illinois case, because the statute therein construed is, frankly, distinguishable from the Michigan Medical Act, in that it makes special provision for those who do not use medicines internally or externally, and who do not practice operative surgery. F, Cases Relied on for a Contrary Construction are Distinguishable Before finally leaving this phase of our investigation and dis- cussion, we must call attention to a case, which, with Smith v. Lane (1881), 31 N. Y. Supreme Court Eeports (24 Hun.), 632, has been relied on by the opponents of our views perhaps more than any other case. That case is State v. Liffring (1899), 61 Ohio St., 39; 46 L. E. A., 334; 76 A. S. E., 358; 55 N. E., 168. We find it cited over and over, in briefs of counsel and in the opinions of those few courts which have held a different view from that here advocated, as being authority for the broad proposition that drugless systems of healing, such as osteopathy, etc., are not in the purview of statutes like the Michigan Medical Act which purport to regulate the ]3ractice of medicine and surgery. x\s a matter of fact the case will sustain no such projDOsition. Liffring was an osteopath indicted under the then Ohio statute, and his demurrer to the indictment was sustained both in the trial court and above. The statute defined practicing medicine or surgery as to prescribe, direct, or recommend for the use of any person, any drug or medicine or other agency for the treatment, cure, or relief of an}^ wound, fracture, or bodily injury, infirmity, or disease. The in- dictment did not, the Supreme Court said, charge the practice of surgery; and the question the court had to answer was whether or not osteopathy was an agency as that word stood in the context of the statute. The court reasoned that the rule of construction, noscitur a sociis, applied; and that the meaning of the word agency must be limited by that of the associated words drug and medicine. It said (page 336, 46 L. E. A.) : It requires the conclusion that the agency intended by the legislature is to be of the general character of a drug or medicine, and to be applied or administered, as are drugs or medicines, with a view to producing effects by virtue of it& own potency.](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21171609_0078.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
