Elements of criticism / By Henry Home, Lord Kames.

  • Kames, Henry Home, Lord, 1696-1782.
Date:
1839
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Elements of criticism / By Henry Home, Lord Kames. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    38/510 (page 16)
    1G EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS. article of which can with truth he controverted, there is reason to be surprised at the blindness of some philosophers, who, by dark and confused notions, are led to deny all motives to action but what arise from self-love. Man, for aught appears, might possibly have been so framed, as to be susceptible of no passions but what have self for their object: but man thus framed, would be ill fitted for society: his constitution, partly selfish, partly social, fits him much better for his present situation.* Of self every one hath a direct perception ; of other things we have no knowledge but by means of their attributes; and hence it is, that of self the perception is more lively than of any other thing. Self is an agreeable object; and for the reason now given, must be more agreeable than any other object. Is this sufficient to account for the prevalence of self-love ? In the foregoing part of this chapter it is suggested, that some circumstances make beings or things fit objects for desire, others not. This hint ought to be pursued. It is a truth ascertained by universal experience, that a thing which, in our apprehension, is beyond reach, never is the object of desire; no man, in his right senses, desires to walk on the clouds, or to descend to the centre of the earth: we may amuse ourselves in a reverie, with building castles in the air, and wishing for what can never happen; but such things never move desire. And, indeed, a desire to do what we are sensible is beyond our power, would be altogether absurd. In the next place, though the difficulty of attainment, with respect to things within reach, often inflames desire; yet, where the prospect of attainment is faint, and the event extremely uncertain, the object, however agreeable, seldom raiseth any strong desire : thus beauty, or any other good quality, in a woman of rank, seldom raises love in a man greatly her inferior. In the third place, different objects, equally within reach, raise emotions in different degrees; and when desire accompanies any of these emotions, its strength, as is natural, is proportioned to that of its cause. Hence the remarkable dif- ference among desires directed to beings inanimate, animate, and rational: the emotion caused by a rational being, is out of mea- sure stronger than any caused by an animal without reason ; and an emotion raised by such an animal, is stronger than what is caused by any thing inanimate. There is a separate reason why desire of which a rational being is the object, should be the strongest. Our desires swell by partial gratification; and the means we have of gratifying desire, by benefiting or harming a rational being, * As the benevolence of many human actions is beyond the possibility of doubt, the argument commonly insisted on for reconciling such actions to the selfish system, is, that the only motive I can have to perform a benevolent action, or an action of any kind, is the pleasure that it affords me. So much then is yielded, that we are pleased when we do good to others ; which is a fair admission of the principle of benevolence: for without that principle what pleasure could one have in doing good to others ? And admitting a principle of benevolence, why may it not be a motive to action, as well as selfishness is, or any other principle ?