Volume 1

Wharton and Stille's medical jurisprudence.

  • Francis Wharton
Date:
1873
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Wharton and Stille's medical jurisprudence. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    81/924 page 51
    Bellart, in Paris, some days before the execution of Marshal Hey, Prince of Moskowa, the usher, having the name of M. Marechal Aine to announce, pronounced it “ M. le Marechal Ney.” “An electric shudder ran through the assembly, and, for my own part, I own that the resemblance to the prince was for a moment as perfect to my eyes as reality.” The delusion was the effect of a highly excited imagination, seizing upon an association of sounds. The dispelling of this delusion was the result of “perception,” “thought,” “reason,” and “memory,” acting healthily. The delusion could not have continued to exist while these latter functions of mind continued in a healthy state. If it had continued to exist, this would have been a proof that these functions were diseased. Or, to state the proposition generally, no insane delusion can continue to operate, when proper modes have been taken to dispel it, while the reason is unimpaired. The fact that such a delusion continues to operate, under such condi¬ tions, proves the unsoundness of the reason. § 50. That such, indeed, is C. J. Cockburn’s own conclusion, we gather from the concluding and italicized portions of the extract just quoted; and the apparent conflict of opinion to which we have adverted, may therefore be reconciled when we recollect that as in sanity, so in insanity, there are various gradations, and that sanity and insanity, therefore, have a region in which they melt into each other imperceptibly. To adopt an illustration that Lord Penzance borrows from Mr. Burke, we know what night is, and we know what day is, but it is hard for us to say when either day or night becomes twilight. Hence, just as some sane persons (e.g. in sleep or when acting under compulsion), may be irresponsible, so some insane persons may be responsible, and be legally viewed as such. A person may be of diseased mind, yet may be capable of testi¬ fying, in cases when such evidence is necessary,(b) in a court of justice; may make contracts, as has just been seen, which, when there is no unfairness, and the party contracted with is without notice, will be held binding; and may be responsible, though (5) R. v. Hill, 2 Den. C. C. 254 ; Fennel n. Tail, 1 C. M. & R. 584; Spittle v. Walton, 40 L. J. Chan. 368. Infra, § 242. 51 % v
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