Psychological conceptions in other sciences : the Herbert Spencer lecture delivered at Oxford 14 May, 1929 / by Charles S. Myers.
- Charles Samuel Myers
- Date:
- 1929
Licence: In copyright
Credit: Psychological conceptions in other sciences : the Herbert Spencer lecture delivered at Oxford 14 May, 1929 / by Charles S. Myers. Source: Wellcome Collection.
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![tion of ‘reflexes’, almost mechanical, practically void of adaptation to experience. The old view expressed by Spencer, and not yet wholly extinct among biologists, was that consciousness has arisen as an ‘ epiphenomenal * product of living matter when physiological processes became too complex to work automatically. The modern psychological view is the direct converse of this—namely, that consciousness, however primitive, fulfilling, however feebly, the functions of orderly direction and purpose, is primary, and that it has grown by distillation, differentia¬ tion, and restriction to narrower, more dominating, higher levels within the organism. Once again we see the same principle illustrated—that the new is already contained within the old. No one would be so foolish as to suppose that the new is clearly manifest as such in the old or that integration and co-ordination have not played an important part in Evolution. The questions we have to consider are—how far does the conception of the construction of the hetero¬ geneous out of the homogeneous by differentiation instead of by aggregation and how far does the conception of the simple having been resolved from, instead of combining to form, the complex,—how far do these conceptions deserve consideration in regard to the evolution of the Universe as a whole ? If the elements in it are comparable to the notes of a tune or to the words of a language, which came first— the compounds, music and language, or the elements, scales and grammar? In a book written eighty-six years ago by a physicist who achieved only posthumous distinction, entitled Thoughts on some Mental Functions, occurs this striking sentence: ‘We are led to expect that if molecular philoso¬ phy is ever destined to advance into the region of [biological] organization the phenomena of perceptive consciousness will admit of being applied to illustrate the physical aspect of the elementary process of matter.’ ‘Organization’, this author maintained, ‘ is to be viewed ... as a grand exhibi¬ tion of the capabilities of the elements of matter. ... It is from molecular adaptations that the amazing monuments](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b30627825_0024.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
