Volume 1

Encyclopædia of religion and ethics / edited by James Hastings ; with the assistance of John A. Selbie ... and other scholars.

Date:
1908-1926
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Encyclopædia of religion and ethics / edited by James Hastings ; with the assistance of John A. Selbie ... and other scholars. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    Literatoek.—The literature on the Absolute is almost co- extensive with the history of philosophical speculation. I. The term ‘ Absolute.’—A discussion of the meaning of the term, and of the relation of the Absolute to knowledge, will be found in Hamilton’s Discussions on Philosophy and Literature; see also Laurie's Synthetica, vol. ii. p. 392 ff. II. ‘Absolute’ as a philosophjgal principle.—^) Dis- cussions.-Bosanquet, ‘Time and the Absolute’ in Proc. of Aristot. Society, 1896 ; Braun, ‘ La Logique de I’Absolu ’ in Revue Philosophique, xxiv. [1887]; Haidar, ‘ The Conception of the Absolute ’ in Philos. Review, viii. [1899]; James, ‘ Absolutism ■ “ ■ ■ ■ '!in Mind, O. S. ix. [1884]; Joi and Empiric and Relatii lute as Ethical Postulat PoweU, ‘ The Absolute an Renouvier, ‘ Les Cat6goi' in PhUos. Re^v le Relative ’ in Scie ie la raison el ‘The j hilosophique, vil. [1897]; Rogers, ‘ The ^1 ’ inMind, N. S. ix. [1900]; RusseU, A., 1 ‘ The Absolute ’ in CR xvii. [1871]; Schwarz, ‘ Die verschied. issung d. Substantialitat d. Absoluten ’ in Ztschr. f. Philos, u. HI. Krit. xxiii. [1853]; Vaihinger, ‘ Der Begriff d. Absoluten it Riioksicht auf Spencer,’ ib. xxiu. [1853]; Watson, ‘ The hanliite and the Time Process ’ in Philos. Rev. iv. [1895]. RPRETATioNS.—Aristotle, Metaphys.; Bradley, Ap- and Reality; Fic'hte,^Wissenschaftslehre^,^ „ ^ , us, 'Republic; Rriyce, World the Individual; Schelling, Transcendental Idealismus, Natur- philosophie; H. Spencer, First Principles; Spinoza, Ethics. For further literature see Baldwin, DPhP iii. pt. ii. 697. J. B. Baillie. ABSOLUTE (Vedanfcic and Buddhistic).—In India a broad conception of the Absolute is first met with in the Upanisads, compiled about B.C. 500. There Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is de- scribed as the One Keality, or the Absolute, who is self-supporting and self-existent. ‘ He has no hands or legs, but He can catch and move; He has no eyes, but He can see, has no ears but can hear ; He knows all, but there is none who knows Him ; He is called the Good and Great Being. Upon Him the sun cannot shine, nor the moon nor the stars; the lightning cannot flash on Him, how can the fire? They all reflect His radiant light, and through His light they are illumined.’ * Since B.C. 500 the doctrine of the Absolute has been considerably developed in the Vedanta and Buddhist systems of philosophy. In the Brahma- sutra, the first work of the Vedanta philosophy composed before the Christian era, Brahma is spoken of as the pure ‘Being’ who, associated with the principle of illusion (rtidya), is enabled to project the appearance of the world, just as a magician is enabled to produce illusory appear- ances of animate and inanimate beings, f VVhen the veil of illusion is withdrawn, the phenomenal world vanishes, and Brahma asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing but the Self-existent Absolute Being. In the Vedanta philosophy the doctrine of the Absolute is styled monism (advaita- vetda). It underwent further developments at the hands of ^ankaracharya (A.D. 785), Ramannja (12th cent. A.D.), Madhvacharya (13th cent. A.D.), Vallabhacharya (A.D. 1479), and others. But the philosopher who most firmly grasped the doctrine of the Absolute was Budd'ha-Sakya- Simha, the eminent founder of Buddhism, who flourished about B.c. 500. In the Sutta and Abhidhamma pitakas of the Pali Scriptures, sup- posed to have been delivered by Buddha himself, the doctrine of the Absolute is designated as the philosophy of the Void (iunya-vdda) or the Middle Path (majjhima patipadd), according to which the Avorld is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither. J In the Sanskrit works of the Mahayana Buddhists, such as in the Madhyamika-Sutr'a (of Nagarjuna, about A.D. 200), Lankavatara-Stitra (about A.D. 400), Lalitavistara (about A.D. 100), Prajnaparamita (about A.D. 200), etc., the doctrine has been further developed, and has often been styled the ‘phenomenal doctrine’ (nairdtmavada) or the ‘perfection of wisdom’ (prajndpdramitd).% In order to understand the Buddhist doctrine of the Absolute, we may suppose that Indian philo- * Svetasvatara-Upanisad and Kathopanisad. t Thibaut, Introd. to'Vedanta Sutra, i. p. xxv {SEE). t Cf. Sarva-dariana-safigraha'^, Oowell and Gough’s tr., 2! § Laiikavatdra-sutra, p. 1; A§ta-sdhasrikd Prajnd-pdrami sophers are mainly divided * into three classes: (1) Realists {dstika), (2) Nihilists {ndstika), and (3) Absolutists (advayavadin). Some sections of the Charvakas, who maintain that the world is not permanent, not real, and not existent,—that is, who emphasize the negative aspect of the world, —are designated Nihilists or Negativists. The propounders of the six orthodox systems of Hindu philosophy, viz. the Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimaifasa, and Vedanta, who main- tain that the world is somehow permanent, real, and existent,—that is, who emphasize the positive aspect of the world,—are designated the Realists. According to them, there is at least one reality on which the fabric of the world stands. Thus the Nyaya and VaiSesika hold that the material atoms, sky, space, and time, are the permanent entities in the external world, while the souls are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Sankhya and Yoga maintain that nature (prakrti) is the permanent reality in the external world, while the souls (purusa) are the eternal realities in the internal world. The Vedanta school affirms that Brahma, the All-pervading Being, is the one eternal reality in the external as well as in the internal world. So we find that the various branches of the Realistic philosophy, in spite of their mutual differences in other respects, agree in maintaining that there is at least one permanent reality on which the whole world hinges. The Buddhists, who maintain f that the world is neither real nor unreal, that it is neither an existence nor a non-existence, but transcends both, —that is, who emphasize neither the negative nor the positive aspect of the world, but go beyond both, — are designated the Transcendentalists, Absolutists, Phenomenalists, Voidists, Agnostics, or the Followers of the Middle Path. The world, according to the Buddhists,^: is an aggregate of conditions or relations. Things come into existence in virtue of these relations or con- ditions. There are infinite kinds of relation, such as the relation of substance and quality, part and whole, cause and effect, etc. Taking the relation of substance and quality, we find that the sub- stance exists only in relation to its qualities, and the latter exist only in relation to the former. Take, for instance, a table. It has a certain weight, colour, taste, smell, size. The table exists only as the repository of these qualities, and the latter exist only as inherent in the former. We cannot conceive a table which has no size, weight, colour, etc., nor can we think of size, weight, etc., apart from the table in which they inhere. Arguing in this way, we find that the parts exist only in relation to the whole, and the Avliole exists only in relation to the parts. So the eye exists in relation to the colour, and the colour exists only in relation to the eye. Similarly, the fire exists in relation to the fuel, and the fuel exists in relation to the fire. Proceeding in this way, we find that the whole world is resolvable into infinite kinds of relation or condition. The relations or conditions themselves are dependent upon one another. The very notions of ‘existence’ and ‘ non-existence ’ are interdependent, for the one is possible only in relation to the other. Origination and cessation, persistence and dis- continuance, unity and plurality, coming and going—these are the eight principal relative con- ceptions which are the fundamental faults of ignorant minds, from which most of our prejudices and wrong judgments arise. People think that the law of coming and going actually operates in the world, that there are in reality persistence and * Madhyamikd-vritti. in JETS iii. pt. 8).