Volume 1
Encyclopædia of religion and ethics / edited by James Hastings ; with the assistance of John A. Selbie ... and other scholars.
- Date:
- 1908-1926
Licence: In copyright
Credit: Encyclopædia of religion and ethics / edited by James Hastings ; with the assistance of John A. Selbie ... and other scholars. Source: Wellcome Collection.
79/932
![structure, but with its function or purpose in the development of the intellectual life. This dis- tinction of standpoint does much to clear away the difficulties and confusions which attended the older discussions of the subject. For example, it puts in a new light the point at issue between Locke and Berkeley regarding the existence of abstract general ideas. It is possible to grant Berkeley’s contention that abstract ideas must exist psycho- logically as particulars in individual form, and at the same time to maintain that as functions of the knowledge-process, i.e. as loffical ideas, they neces- sarily transcend their individual mode of existence and are real imiversals. The q^uestion then arises as to the relation of the knowledge-process to the ideas viewed as psychical content. Can the psychological states of conscious- ness be regarded as the original form from which the logical idea is derived by abstraction? This has been very commonly maintained. Mr. F. H. Bradley tells us that a logical meaning ‘consists of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.’ The whole trend of modern logic (including Mr. Bradley’s own work) shows conclusively, however, that it is impossible to begin with ‘ mental states ’ and pass by way of abstraction to logical ideas. The view of the cognitive side of consciousness, as at first made up of particular images or ideas, is now acknowledged to be a fiction. And similarly we must reject the gwasi-mechanical account of the formation of general ideas which is based on this fiction, accord- ing to which we are said first to abstract the common element from the particular images and then proceed further to generalize it, thus in some mysterious way transforming it into a logical idea. But we cannot derive knowledge from an anoetic process, and therefore must postulate that con- sciousness is from its first beginnings a process of interpretation and generalization. It starts from a content that is a vague presentation continuum, lacking both differentiation and integration, and, as such, not yet either particular or universal. It is the work of intelligence to transform this into a coherent system of parts. Now it must con- stantly be borne in mind that it is within this total knowledge-process, and as contributory to it, that abstraction finds its function and justification. It is not the end or essence of thinking, but a process or method which thought uses in the accomplish- ment of its own ends. The purpose which it fulfils is closely related to that of Analysis, though the specific method of abstraction has its own difier- entia. ‘ The reflective idea which guides it,’ says Bosanquet, ‘ is the equivalent in general knowledge of the mathematical axiom that if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal.’ But, as within any real whole the withdrawal of one part never leaves the other parts unaffected, the guiding idea of abstraction is only provisional. ‘ It amounts to no more than this, that within known wholes known changes may appear to leave remainders knoum as unchanged' (Logic, ii. 22f.). Abstraction as a specific process is thus only a provisional expedient; and, unless corrected by a more adequate conception of the nature of the whole, it is likely in most fields to lead to error. But thinking proceeds both by concretion and abstraction, and these two moments are never entirely distinct and separate. Aristotle, and the formal logicians following him, have seemed to oppose A&traction (a4)aip6(ns) and Determination (■npbtrOecns). When, however, we emphasize the unity of the intellectual process within which both these functions operate, we see that the opposition can never be more than relative. Abs- traction and Determination, like Analysis and Synthesis (within which they may be said to be included), imply each other as complementary moments of real thinking. The goal which thought seeks is not to be gained by passing to the highest abstraction; for this is the emptiest of aU thoughts. Nor can it be reached by the determination of a plurality of particulars. But the methods of abs- traction and determination must unite in defining experience in terms of a concrete universal. It is against the abuse of abstraction, against making isolation and mutilation the final goal of thinking, and thus neglecting the organic whole- ness and unity of things, that Hegel’s criticism is chiefly directed. The process of abstraction is for him never an end in itself, but only a means in the progress towards greater unity and concreteness. Literature.—B. Maennel, JJeUr Abstraktim (1890); A. Meinongr, VierUljahrschr. f. wissen. Phil. (1888) 329 ff., and ZP xxiv. 34 fl. ; Bosanquet, Logic, 1898, ii. 21 ff. ; J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism^ (1903), L 255 ff.; Baldwin, DPhP, S.V., and the literature under Attention, Psycholoqy. _ _ J. E. Creighton. ABU (Mount).—A famous mountain and place of Hindu and Jain pilgrimage, rising like an island out of the great plain of Rajputana, in the native State of Sirohi. The name is derived from its Skr. title Arhuda, ‘ a serpent,’ ‘ a long round mass,’ perhaps from the root arh, ‘to go,’ ‘to hurt,’ pro- bably with reference to its form. Its summit. Guru &ikhara, ‘Peak of the Teacher,’ rises to a height of 5,653 feet above the level of the sea. is hardly to be wondered at,’ writes Fergusson {RUtory -.idian and Eastern Architecture, ed. 1899, p. 234), ‘that Mount 5bu was early fixed upon by the Hindus and Jains as le of their sacred spots. Rising from the desert as abruptly IceSiWe^ scarps 6000 ft. or^ 6000 ft?’h?g*h, and'^the *sum^t can ! approached only by ravines cut into its sides. When the mmit is reached, it opens out into one of the loveliest valleys laginable, 6 or 7 miles long by 2 or 3 miles in width, cut up erywhere by granite rocks of the most fantastic shapes, and le spaces between covered vrith trees and luxuriant vegetation. The little Nucki Talao [properly Nakhi Talao, as it was supposed to have been excavated by the naUs (Skr. nakha) of the gods] is one of the loveliest gems of its class in India, and it is near to it, at Dilwarra, that the Jains selected a place for their Tirth [Skr. tirtha] or sacred place of rendezvous. It cannot, however, be said that it has been a favourite place of worship in modern times. Its distance and inaccessibility are probably the causes of this, and it consequently cannot rival Palitana or Girnar in the extent of its buildings.’ Tod styles Mount Abu ‘ the Olympus of India,’ because in olden times it was reputed to be the favourite residence of the gods, and was believed to be the scene of two famous events in Hindu mythology. Here the munis (or sages), of whom Vasistha, a worshipper of Siva, was the leader, practised austerities, living on milk and the fruits of the earth. There was then no mountain, but only a cleft in the plain, into which the cow that supplied the wants of the sage fell, and was miracu- loudy floated out by a rise of water from beneath. To prevent the recurrence of such an accident, the sage prayed to Siva, then enthroned on the Kailasa peak of the Himalaya. He called on the sons of Himachal, the deified mountain range, to relieve the saint. The youngest son of Himachal volun- teered to exile himself, and, mounted on the serpent Takshaka, he journeyed to the holy land. At the behest of the sage he leaped into the cleft, em- braced, as he fell, by the serjsent god. Within the cleft the snake wri^ed so violently that Vasistha appealed again to Siva, who from the depths of Patala, the nether-world, raised his toe until it ap- peared at the top of the mountain, which was thus formed by the god. Hence, under the title of Achala l&vara, ‘ Immovable Lord,’ Siva has become the patron deity of the hill. But in accordance with the eclectic spirit of Hinduism, this does not pre- vent the jdace from becoming a site sacred both to Vaisnavas and Jains. The second legend tells of the creation of the Agnikula, or ‘ fire-born ’ septs of the Rajputs. The Baity as, or demons, it is](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b29001225_0001_0079.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
