EU Framework Programme for European research and technological development : evidence / Select Committee on Science and Technology.
- Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. Science and Technology Committee.
- Date:
- 1997
Licence: Open Government Licence
Credit: EU Framework Programme for European research and technological development : evidence / Select Committee on Science and Technology. Source: Wellcome Collection.
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![6 November 1996 ] [ Continued technologies (in materials, biochemistry, communications, etc) which are needed for European industry to remain competitive in world markets. This is not to be confused with sectoral support which, again, is no business of publicly funded European RTD programmes. Rather, like priorities described in the UK foresight exercise, the aim should be to support the research which lays a firm basis for future competitiveness. TASK FORCES 33. Where task forces have worked well, they have provided a useful tool for clearer definition of RTD objectives by involving a wide range of industrial and research community interests. They have usefully brought together different Commission Directorates-General, thus improving inter-programme co- ordination and the integration of RTD with Community policies. Some task forces (for example those on vaccines and viral diseases and on aeronautics) have produced worthwhile reports which have served to draw out important conclusions for the targeting of RTD efforts in Europe. 34. The Government remains dubious, however, about the benefits of task forces as currently defined. Selected on an arbitrary basis without consultation with member States, the existing task forces define a skewed set of priorities. In several cases, initially at least, they have consulted only patchily. A number have failed adequately to involve member States. In others, their remits have lacked coherence and ranged unmanageably wide, leading them to address issues to which RTD is only partly relevant. As a result, recommendations have been ill-founded in some cases. 35. As the lack of progress with the Commission’s proposal for supplementary funding for FP4 has shown, particular problems have arisen in attempting to transplant task force recommendations onto a programme organised fairly tightly on technologies. Quite apart from the difficulties of reaching consensus on a heterogenous set of priorities, the management mechanisms of FP4 are ill-adapted to incorporate new areas of activity that cut across several programmes. These problems are exacerbated by confused authorities: as internal Commission working groups with no accountability to member States, task forces cannot be responsible for the adaptation of specific programmes, or be given any budgetary authority, to implement task force recommendations. So the task force conclusions have to be implemented through programme management committees. Whilst this can be done relatively easily in areas where there is close co-operation between the separate Commission structures (eg in the life sciences), in other areas it is proving more difficult to give effect to newly identified trans-programme priorities, especially where these clash with the priorities (for example of member state representatives on Management Committees) at the level of individual programmes. 36. In government’s view, the best features of the task force approach—a problem oriented focus, a key role for RTD users, extensive consultation and concentration of expertise—are well worth carrying forward into FP5. But these principles need to be incorporated into a management structure for FPS which can define and oversee the RTD needed to achieve targeted, user-led goals. To be successful, both the goals and the management mechanisms need to be built in from the start. As described above, retrospective adaptation to achieve these goals creates real difficulties. 37. The UK position paper makes proposals for procedures and machinery in FP5 to achieve these ends (see paragraphs 20-29). The best features of task forces are explicitly reflected in the proposed “Advisory Groups” which will be drawn from user interests, member States and the Commission. They will need closely to involve the scientific community. Their key roles are to identify the RTD needed to achieve each objective and provide strategic oversight as the programme proceeds. They can thus act as a proxy customer, ensure interprogramme co-ordination and provide a concentration of expertise. VALUE FOR MONEY 38. The UK derives benefit from the framework programmes both through its share of programme receipts, which provide a substantial source of research funding, and more broadly, from gains from collaboration in RTD and the impact on the competitiveness of UK firms, for example from enabling them to extend their activities into new markets. UK receipts 39. There are difficulties in establishing the UK’s share of framework programme receipts. As a matter of principle, the Commission refuses to provide aggregated data on the shares of programme funding going to member States. The UK with other member States is pressing the Commission to provide this information. Although data on UK receipts has however been collated by the Office of National Statistics and the Higher Education Statistical Agency, it is not fully accurate. The most recent figures, for 1994/95 show UK receipts of £263 million, of which £89 million went to business enterprise, £145 million to higher education institutions and £28 million to public sector research organisations. The figure of £263 million slightly overstates the true figure since it includes some additional non-framework programme receipts that cannot be separated out.](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b32218734_0013.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
