EU Framework Programme for European research and technological development : evidence / Select Committee on Science and Technology.
- Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. Science and Technology Committee.
- Date:
- 1997
Licence: Open Government Licence
Credit: EU Framework Programme for European research and technological development : evidence / Select Committee on Science and Technology. Source: Wellcome Collection.
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![6 November 1996 ] [ Continued administration. Though the Commission themselves claim that their costs compare well with those of similar organisations in member States, comparable costs for UK Research Councils are well under 5 per cent and are subject even then to continual downard pressure. To some extent, the Commission costs reflect the inherently high costs of managing an international civil service and the inevitably high costs of managing multinational projects. Nevertheless, while some improvements have been made in FP4, the slowness and complexity of selection and project management procedures compound costs, as well as causing frustration and delay for applicants. Factors outside the control of the units directly responsible for programme administration, such as the lack of delegation in Commission procedures for financial approvals, also lengthen processes for no added value. Poor co-ordination between different Commission Directorates- General reduces programme effectiveness and makes for sub-optimal integration of RTD and other Community policies. 63. As mentioned in paragraph 12 above, there are many specific aspects of programme management that need improvement. The Commission review of management procedures has proposed action to tackle a number of the problems. The UK will be watching the implementation of these recommendations closely. Nevertheless it is clear that there is a long way to go in achieving fully acceptable standards of efficiency and transparency and to address the broader problems that the Commission’s review does not cover, for example internal delegation within the Commission and improved intra-Commission co-ordination. 64. The UK paper also indicates that there may be scope for more extensive contracting out of programme management, both to relieve pressure on the Commission’s resources and to benefit from private sector expertise. Recent initiatives in devolved managment in FP4 may offer some helpful models for the future. LENGTH OF FRAMEWORK PROGRAMMES 65. The length of framework programmes needs to achieve a balance between the need for stability and continuity on the one hand, and for proper accountability and responsiveness to changing needs on the other. Given the immense effort that negotiation of a programme constitutes, involving a two and a half year run- up to a new programme, the UK would if anything favour a slightly longer programme, say five years instead of four. A shorter programme would imply less stability for the research community and be likely to mean starting the next round of negotiations as soon as the current programme began. 66. Accepting a longer programme would depend, however, on its embodying adequate flexibility to respond to new needs and new scientific developments, but without losing or weakening member state control. The UK believes that a well-planned programme should be able to provide such flexibility. The formal Council decisions for each specific programme should provide clear, well focused objectives, but avoid too much detail, which is better left to the underpinning work programmes which give practical effect to the decision. 67. These work programmes form the basis for the calls for proposals to which researchers respond. They can be regularly reviewed to reflect changing market needs or technological advance. This is the practice already in a number of FP4 programmes, although the extent of the scope for adaptation depends on the nature of the relevant decision. Reviewing and adapting work programmes represents a quick, flexible response to new needs and avoids the delays and complexity of a further legislative process. It also ensures sufficient control for member States through their membership of the programme Management Committees which are responsible for approving and amending work programmes, and keeps the RTD within the broad framework agreed by Council and the European Parliament. 68. The evolution of work programmes is to be preferred to alternative approaches such as untargeted programme lines or holding back a proportion of funding in a ‘reserve’. Experience of ‘reserve’ funding in FP3 and FP4 has not been encouraging. It has proved problematic to reach agreement on the need for additional funding or how the criteria specified in the relevant Council decisions should be applied. IMPACT OF ALLOCATION OF FUNDING FOR EU RTD AND UK RESEARCHERS 69. As explained in the initial paragraphs of this paper the process of allocating public expenditure in the UK takes account both of domestic and EU spending. When public expenditure is under great pressure, this is a necessary discipline. The “attributions” process is the means by which EU expenditure is brought to bear on departmental budgets, though there is no automatic relation between the potential reduction in a department’s budgets attributable to EU RTD expenditure and its domestic S&T programmes, since Ministers can press the case for restoring potential reductions or reallocate resources from elsewhere. The process sharpens the assessment of priorities and provides an incentive to get the very best out of both EU funded and domestic RTD. 70. This incentive operates in several ways. EU funded RTD programmes create major opportunities for UK researchers which they have not been slow to exploit. As described above, they have participated vigorously in successive framework programmes and won valuable amounts of funding. The UK research community has also sought very actively to influence the shape and content of framework programmes at the](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b32218734_0017.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
