Criminal psychology : a manual for judges, practitioners, and students / by Hans Gross ; translated from the 4th German edition by Horace M. Kallen ; with an introduction by Joseph Jastrow.

  • Gross, Hans, 1847-1915.
Date:
1911
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Criminal psychology : a manual for judges, practitioners, and students / by Hans Gross ; translated from the 4th German edition by Horace M. Kallen ; with an introduction by Joseph Jastrow. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School.

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    vnR warn us of the presence of deception, and will prevent its playing a part. I have attempted to compile forms of it according to intent, and will here add a few words.^ That by the lie is meant the intentional deliverance of a conscious untruth for the purpose of deception is as familiar as the variety of opinion concerning the permissibility of so-called necessary lies, of the pious, of the pedagogic, and the conventional. We have to assume here the standpoint of absolute rigorism, and to say with Kant,^ The lie in its mere form is man's crime against his own nature, and is a vice which must make a man disreputable in his own eyes. We can not actually think of a single case in which we find any ground for lying. For we lawyers need have no pedagogical duties, nor are we compelled to teach people manners, and a situation in which we may save ourselves by lying is unthinkable. Of course, we will not speak all we know; indeed, a proper silence is a sign of a good criminalist, but we need never lie. The beginner must especially learn that the good intention to serve the case and the so-called excusing eagerness to do one's duty, by which little lies are some- times justified, have absolutely no worth. An incidental word as if the accomplice had confessed; an expression intending to convey that you know more than you do; a perversion of some earlier state- ment of the witness, and similar permissible tricks, can not be cheaper than the cheapest things. Their use results only in one's own shame, and if they fail, the defense has the advantage. The lost ground can never be regained.^ Nor is it permissible to lie by gestures and actions any more than by words. These, indeed, are dangerous, because a movement of the hand, a reaching for the bell, a sudden rising, may be very effective under circumstances. They easily indicate that the judge knows more about the matter than he really does, or suggest that his information is greater, etc. They make the witness or defendant think that the judge is already certain about the nature of the case; that he has resolved upon important measures, and other such things. Now movements of this kind are not recorded, and in case the denial of blame is not serious, a young criminalist allows himself easily to be misled by his desire for efficiency. Even accident may help. When I was examining justice I had to hear the testimony of a rather weak-minded lad, who was suspected of having stolen and hidden a large sum of money. The lad firmly and cleverly denied 1 Cf. my Manual, When the witness is unwilling to tell the truth. 2 Kant: Uber ein vermeintliches Recht, aus Menschenliebe zu liigen. • 3 A sentence is here omitted. [Translator.]