Elements of psychology / by George Croom Robertson ; edited from notes of lectures delivered at the college, 1870-1892, by C.A. Foley Rhys Davids.

  • Robertson, George Croom, 1842-1892.
Date:
1896
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Elements of psychology / by George Croom Robertson ; edited from notes of lectures delivered at the college, 1870-1892, by C.A. Foley Rhys Davids. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    47/292 (page 27)
    makes will a ‘relation between feelings.’ But whatever Feeling may mean for Mr. Spencer, his ‘ relations between feelings ’ correspond to our Intellection. But since Feeling is his widest genus for any fact of consciousness, he calls these ‘ relations between feelings ’ themselves feelings. Has he justification for this ? and Lewes ? and others ? In popular language, as we saw, yes. ‘ The table does not feel ’ means it is not conscious. We shall use Feeling in a more special sense, narrower, as we have seen, than theirs, and yet wider than that other popular sense of touch. 7V;e Subject of Mental Phenomena. Feeling, intellection, conation—any experience that can be described under one of these phases is mental] and for us mind is an aggregate of experiences and the collective name for those three. But what is it that experiences the experiences.? What is the bearer of them'? Well, with this, the profoundest of all questions underlying all mental experience, we are not fitted to deal now. We cannot at this stage consider the question of personality, of the ‘ ego,’ ‘ me,’ ‘ moi.’ To this indefinite subject there is a reference in all mental experiences ^ It is involved in all language. It is inextricably mixed up with our experience. ‘ I am aware of the door.’ What is it that refers to the ‘ aware,’ viz. that personal ‘ I ’ ? What is it in intellection, feeling, conation, that knows, is affected, acts? Without reference to such a subject, there can be no science of mind. But it is ' Professor Hoffciing says too much, Professor Bain too little, about this. The former proposes to avoid metaphysical discussion, yet really drags it in and mixes it up. ^ Note that it is by no means the case that all mental facts or phenomena equally suggest, or are equally referable to, a subject.