Letter of the Secretary of War : communicating, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 9th instant, copy of the proceedings of the general court-martial for the trial of assistant surgeon Webster : report of the general-in-chief of the Army on the management of general hospitals : general orders in relation to the medical department, and general orders and instructions relating to hospitals.

  • Webster, Warren, 1835-1896.
Date:
[1864]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Letter of the Secretary of War : communicating, in answer to a resolution of the Senate of the 9th instant, copy of the proceedings of the general court-martial for the trial of assistant surgeon Webster : report of the general-in-chief of the Army on the management of general hospitals : general orders in relation to the medical department, and general orders and instructions relating to hospitals. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the National Library of Medicine (U.S.), through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the National Library of Medicine (U.S.)

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    post hospital and post surgeon, but, as just stated, it relates solely, in the opinion of the accused, to the amount of jurisdiction which subordinate military commanders have, independent of the department commander and the Surgeon General, over general hospitals. The present case finds that Fitzsimmons was a deserter from the 40th regi- ment of New York volunteers; that he, in some way, found himself in general hospital on Governor's island; that on the 15th of October, 1«63, lie was, through Medical Director McDougall, transferred as a patient to McDougall gen- eral hospital; that, November 1, 1863, a severe surgical operation was per- formed on him; that eleven days thereafter General Brown ordered the accused to arrest the man and send him to Fort Columbus; that at that time the man was, by the surgical operation, confined to his ward, his wound dressed twice each day, and his arrest and transfer dangerous to his life; that the surgeon in charge of the ward reported him unable to be moved, except as a patient; that the accused indorsed on the back of General Brown's order the following: Conceiving that the general hospitals are under the sole direction of the Surgeon General of the army, I consider it my duty to obey orders directing the transfer of patients from this hospital only when received through the Sur- geon General, or through his representative in this department, the medical director. That General Brown thereupon directed his officer of the day to remove the man by force from the general hospital, which was done; that the man was taken out, without medical examination, by the persons removing him, into the place or condition of his wound, and in a cold rain-storm made to walk a long distance, and, in the end, sent to Fort Columbus, Avhere it was found that he was not fit or able to be returned to his regiment. The accused, it is alleged, offended by respectfully representing to General Brown the opinion of the accused that general hospitals are under the direction of the Surgeon General, and, therefore, that orders directing transfer of patients must come through that officer or his representative in the department, the med- ical director. Is punishment to be inflicted for making such representation? Did not gen- eral orders, special orders, and the custom of the medical department, warrant such an interpretation? Genera] Orders Nos. 36, of 1S62, and 308, of 1863, it will be remembered, start with the unconditional statement that general hospitals are under the direc- tion of the Surgeon General. What can those orders mean if they do not bear out the construction given them by the accused? The Surgeon General in an indorsement of August 13, 1S63, directed to Med- ical Director McDougall, reiterates General Order No. 36, and says that the Secretary of War had decided, in a case coming up from Iowa, in conformity with this general order, and against the authority of Brigadier General Roberts, commanding the district of Iowa, to interfere with general hospitals. Not only that, but Major General Halleck, in an indorsement commenting on the conduct of General Brown in relation to McDougall hospital and produced here in court, maintained that military commanders, subordinate, like General Brown, to the department commander, had no authority to interfere in the management of gen- eral hospitals. So, also, it has been proved here that Medical Director McDougall decided, in a case of conflict with General Brown, that the McDougall general hospital was self-sustaining, and not connected with the post at Fort Schuyler. How, if the court please, could a subordinate medical officer, like the accused, surrounded with such precedents and orders, but think an order like that of General Brown manifestly contrary to general orders and special decisions, and so unlawful ? At least, will not this condition of rules and regulations prevent the court from finding that the accused acted either wilfully or with wrong intent ?