Report from the Select Committee on the Vaccination Act (1867) : together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index.

  • Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Select Committee on Vaccination Act (1867)
Date:
1871
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Report from the Select Committee on the Vaccination Act (1867) : together with the proceedings of the Committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by Royal College of Physicians, London. The original may be consulted at Royal College of Physicians, London.

    32/558 (page 8)
    Mr. J. Ca/idlisk, M.P. 28 February 1871. Yes, without any doubt; and if the conclusions of the Committee depended upon the substantia- tion of the facts which I have produced, 1 believe the facts would be put before the Committee by the evidence of the persons themselves. 111. Taking the examples in the “ Co-operator” newspaper, will you tell us in what way you pro- ceeded to ascertain the genuineness of the news therein contained ?—By communications with the persons themselves, or by communications with their friends, the friends being frequently known to me. 112. In every case in which you have read us an example from the “ Co-operator,” you have applied to the persons, or to the friends of the persons, themselves?—No; I said otherwise in my examination in chief, as regards the cases to which I referred. 113. You merely gave it as news contained in a newspaper?—Which I believe as 1 believe a report of the Queen’s Bench proceedings in “ The Times ” of this morning. 114. You have stated with regard to one of those persons, that he objected to have his child vaccinated because lie believed that vaccination was blood-poisoning; was that person at all learned in medical science ?—I do not know. 115. With regard to his opinion that vaccina- tion is blood-poisoning, I suppose we must not attach too much weight to it, seeing that he has not any medical knowledge ?—I want the Com- mittee to understand that 1 have given and give no evidence whatever of a medical nature, and I did not adduce that statement to show that it was blood-poisoning, but to establish -the conviction which exists in my own mind in the mind of the Committee, that he was a conscientious objector to vaccination. 116. He chose to suffer imprisonment, you say, for conscience sake, because he thought that vaccination was endangering the life of his child ? —Yes; but 1 do not want to commit myself to the assertion that it was blood-poisoning. 117. Precisely ; but I want to know how much you think conscience has to say to the question ? —In such a case everything. 118. When it is a matter of loose and vague opinion, and a man has no medical knowledge and can have no certainty, nor even just ground of belief that vaccination is endangerino- the life of the child, what question of conscience can arise ?—I do not know how we can otherwise bring our conscience into operation than through our intelligence. Our intellig'ence must be the basis of our conscientious action in every case ; it may be weak or strong, but in every case of conscience there must be intelligence. 119. I thought that you told me that this man was not intelligent in medical matters ?—Pro- bably not; but his intelligence taught him that to vaccinate his child was a cruelty to his child. 120. Did he believe that it was blood-poison- ing because certain persons had gone up and down the country asserting it to be so, or did he believe it from independent investigation ?—I could not in many cases tell you the grounds of my own belief, nor can many of us do so ; but however it was, it was through his intelligence, much or little. 121. Then it appears that there are two sets of persons; some believe that not to vaccinate is to endanger the life of the public; others believe that vaccination endangers the life of the per- son vaccinated. If the non-vaccinators happen to be wrong, I suppose for conscience sake we must put them down and use Ci mpulsion ?—1 will leave the noble Lord resjionsible for that logic; it is not mine. 122. According to your theory there should be no compulsion to prevent persons from en- dangering the lives of others?—Unless vaccina- tion be a protection, I know no grounds upon which we can enforce it. If it is a protection there is no danger. 123. That is the turning point of the whole case, is it not?—In either case it leads me to the same point, either that there should be no law at all, or a mild and tolerant law. 124. But is it not the turning point of the whole case whether vaccination is necessary or not ?—Yes. 125. And that is a medical question?—Yes, that is a medical and an experimental question too. 126. Chairman.] Supposing that the result of the investigation of this Committee were to satisfy your mind that vaccination was a protec- tion, and that the child which was vaccinated would be, reasonably speaking, secure from the terrible calamity of small pox, and that the child who was not vaccinated would be exposed to that calamity, would you still be of the opinion that the State had no duty to the child?—Yes; I think that the parent in any case where there is such ample romn for divergence of opinion should be supreme, and that we go entirely beyond the prerogatives of State action when we intervene in such a case. 127. You think that in that case the respon- sibility rests entirely upon the parent, and that the State has no right to interfere?—Yes; unless, indeed, under the sanction of a mild penalty, he might be required to discharge what the State believes to be his duty. 128. Up to what age would you consider that this right of the parent to the disposal of his child, which in that case would lead to the ex- posure of his child to a great calamity, was vested in the parent?—I do not know that any of our ethical writers have ever determined when the parental prerogative ceases and the prerogative of the child begins. 129. Would you think it applied to a boy of 15 at school?—It depends upon the amount of intelligence and the amount of moral develop- ment in the child ; I do not think it can be fixed at a uniform age. 130. You think that if the child was intelligent the State would owe a duty to it, but if it were not intelligent it would not?—I can make no such statement. The State now says that a child may not marry without the consent of i's parents until it is 21; I will not define when parental duty ceases. 131. Lord Robert Montagu.] Does it depend upon the intelligence of the child?—To some extent. 132. The State owes a duty to idiots and luna- tics who have no intelligence, does it not?—Not as superseding or over-riding parental duties, but in the case of a child the offspring of lunatics, the conditions would be such that 1, believing in vaccination, would vaccinate, and could do so conscientiously. 133. Chairman.'] What was the kind of return which you would wish for ?—I believe that we could very soon get a return from all the magis- trates’ clerks of the convictions which have taken place in their respective courts for violations of this Act. Mr.