Sight and touch : an attempt to disprove the received (or Berkeleian) theory of vision / by Thomas K. Abbott.
- Thomas Kingsmill Abbott
- Date:
- 1864
Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: Sight and touch : an attempt to disprove the received (or Berkeleian) theory of vision / by Thomas K. Abbott. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, through the Medical Heritage Library. The original may be consulted at the Francis A. Countway Library of Medicine, Harvard Medical School.
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![thing that belongs to our notion of extended magnitude in space.* The association between sight and locomotion, or between touch and the movements of the arm, tells us that a remote building implies a certain continuance of our walk- ing exertions to change its appearance into another that we call a nearer view.f The feeling we have when the eyes are parallel and vision distinct is associated with a great and prolonged effort of walking, in other words, with a long dis- tance.;]; For smaller intervals, the material of recollection of one foot is an arm impression, just as the material of re- collection of greenness is a visual impression.§ According to Mr. Bain, then, we find that a certain exer- tion of the muscles of the arm enables us to reach and touch certain objects; a little increase of exertion is necessary for others, and less for those that are nearer. Now it is plain that we can obtain from all this nothing but the idea of muscular exertion. This Mr. Bain appears to admit, and he maintains that our idea of distance is nothing else. If Mr. Bain really has no other idea of distance or depth, I do not see how he is to be convinced that that of most men is dif- ferent. Indeed if it were certain that a man born blind has no other idea of distance than that it is something to be * Ibid, p. 368. t Ibid> P- 369. $ Ibid, p. 371. § Although not directly treating the question of Realism, I cannot help remarking the singularity of a theory which resolves our perception of the external into a consciousness of our own energy. Certainly, a blow or a knock which rouses no energy gives us as decided a sense of the ex- ternal as the motion of the hand in lifting a weight. The first passage cited is most extraordinary. It may be fairly paraphrased: Our belief that our sensations are produced by something without us means that they are produced by ourselves. After such a statement it is scarcely worth while to observe, that the fact to be accounted for is not a belief that the causes of our sensations are external, which statement might apply to the more subjective senses of hearing and smelling, but a belief that we perceive, see, and feel the causes themselves when we are not conscious of any sensation.](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21037930_0073.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
