An essay concerning humane understanding ... / written by John Locke.

  • John Locke
Date:
1695
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: An essay concerning humane understanding ... / written by John Locke. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    54/474 (page 4)
    What Idea ^ 8 Thus much I thought neceftary to fay concerning the Occasion (lands jou 0f this Enquiry into humane Underftanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this Subject, 1 rnuft here in the Entrance beg Pardon of my Reader, for the frequent ufe of the Word Idea, which he will find in the following Treatife. It being that Term, which, I think, ferves belt to (land for whatfoever is the Objetf: of the Underftanding when a Man thinks, I have ufed it toexprefs whatever is meant by Than* tafm, $ often, Species, or whatever it is,which the Mind can be employ’d about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently ufing it. I prefume it will be eafiiy granted me, that there are fuch Ideas in Men’s Minds • every one is confcious of them in himfelf, and Men’s Words and A&ions will fatisfie him, that they are in others. Our firft Enquiry then fhall be, how they come into the Mind. .i AY > C H A P. II. No innate Principles in the Mind. The way fhewn hew we come by any know¬ ledge, fuffici- ent to prove it not innate. General Af- fent the great Argument. VniverfalCon fent proves no thing innate. §. 1.1T is aneftablilhed Opinion amongftfome Men, That there are in I the Underftanding certain innate Principles; feme primary No¬ tions, Koivau iwoiauj, Charatfters, as it were damped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very firft Being ; and brings into the World with it. It would be fufficient toconvince unprejudiced Readers of the falfenefs of thisSuppofition, if I lliould only (hew (as I hope I fhall in the following Parts of this Difcourfe) how Men barely by the Ufe of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, with¬ out the help of any innate Impreftions ,* and may arrive at Certainty, without any fuch Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will eafiiy grant, That it would be impertinent to fuppofe the Ideas of Colours innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external Objects : and no lefs unreafonable would it be to attribute feveral Truths, to the Impreftions of Nature, and innate Characters, when we may obferve in cur felves Faculties, fit to attain as eafy and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were Originally imprinted on the Mind. But becaufe a Man is not permitted without Cenfure to follow his own Thoughts in the fearch of Truth, when they lead him ever fo little out of the common Road: I flaall fet down the Reafons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as anExcufe for my miftake, if I be in one,which l leave to be confidered by thofe, who, with me, difpofethem- felvesto embrace Truth, where-ever they find it. §, z. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted,than that there are certain Principles both Speculative and Pradical (for they fpeak of both) univerfally agreed upon by all Mankind : which therefore they argue, muft needs be the conftant Impreftions, which the Souls of Men receive in their firft Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as neceflarily and really as they do any of tneir inherent Faculties. §.3. This Argument drawn from Vniverfal Confent, has this Misfor- * tune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fatft, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there