Knight's store of knowledge for all readers: being a collection of treatises, in various departments of knowledge / by several authors.

Knight, Charles, 1791-1873

Date:: [1841]

Credit: Knight's store of knowledge for all readers: being a collection of treatises, in various departments of knowledge / by several authors. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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$shal of Eiiglaml. “ You have sent me,” thus wrote to him the Prince Regent of England, in a most flattering letter, ” among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the statY of a French Marshal, and I send you in return that of England. The Spanish Cortes, hy a decree, created him Duke of Vitto- ria, and granted him in perpetuity the estate of Soto de Roma, in the kingdom of Granada. When Napoleon, in his c-imp in Saxony, heard of the dis- aster of Yittoria, he was sorely vexed, and he immediately sent IMarshal Soult to the Army of Spain, with the rank of ” Lieutenant of the Emperor.” Soult arrived on the Spanish frontier on the 13th of July, and set about restoring order and contidence in his army, which consisted of nine divisions of infantry, nearly 80,000 men, and three divisions of cavalry. He told them, in a proclamation, dated July, that the disasters of the preceding campaign were owing to pusillanimous coun- cils and unskilful dispositions of their late commanders. “ Let us not, how'ever,” added he, defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive, and the valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy.” He concluded by saying that his instructions from the Empe- ror were “ to drive the enemy from those lofty heights which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, aiul drive them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil tliat your tents must next be pitched, and your resources drawn Let the account of our success be dated from ^ ittoria, and the birth of his Imperial Majesty he celebrated in that city. Marshal Soult's first object was to relieve Pamplona. W ith this view he collected the main body of his army at St. Jeaii Pied de Port, and op tbe 25th of July attacked, with be- tween 30,000 and 40,000 men, the British right at Ronces-' valles. General Cole moved to the support of that post, but the French having turned the British position. General Cole considered it necessary to withdraw in the night, and march to Zubiri. In the mean time two French divisions attacked General Hill’s position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the valley of Baztan. At first they gained ground, but were again ilriven back, when the retvpgfinl® movement ot General Cole, on his right, induced General Hill to withdraw likewise to Irurita. Lord Wellington, who had his head-quarters at Lesaca, on the left of the army, heard of these movements late in the night, and concentrated his army to the right. •J7th the French made a partial attack on the 4th division, near Sorauren, but were repulsed. On the 28th Soult di- rected a graiid attack, first on the left, by the vaUey of the Lanz, and then on the centre of the British positioii. The 1th division. General Coles, sustained nearly the whole brunt of the attack, and repulsed the enemy with the bayonet. In one instance the French succeeded in overpowering a Portuguese battalion on the right of General Ross's brigade, at the ohai)el of Sorauren, which obliged General Ross to withdraw, and the enemy established himself for a moment on the line ot the .Allies, but laird Wellington directed the 27lh and 18th regi- ments to charge, and the French were driven down the hill with great loss. Soon after the fighting ceased. On the 29th Ixith armies remained inactive. Soult changed his plan, and on the 30th endeavoured to turn the British left by an attack on General Hill. He collected a large body on his right for this purpose, and, by manoeuvring on the left flank ol Hill’s corps, obliged him to withdraw from the height which he oc- cupied behind Lizasso to another range about a mile in the rear where, however. General Hill maintained himself against every effort that was made to dislodge him. At the same time Lord M’ellingtoii attacked the French corps iii his front, in a strong position, betweeti the valley of the Unz that of Arga, and obliged them to retire. On the morning of the 31st the Ftencb were in full retreat into France, by the various passes of the Pyrenees, followed by the Allies, who took many prison- ers and much baggage. These various combats arc designated by the name of the “ Battles of the Pyrenees.” On the 1st of August Lord Wcllingtoii resumed possession ol the jiasses in the inuunlains. During the month of August General Graham was pressing the siege of St. Sebastian. On the 31st, a breach being made, the assault was made, and the town was carried, but with great loss. The French garrison retired to the castle. Many ex- cesses were committed hy the British and Portuguese soldiers after they had entered the town i most of the houses were plundered, and it was not until the 2nd ot September that order was restored by severe measures. But as this calami- tous atl'air was made the ground ot accusation against the British oflicers and army in general, we must refer the reader to Lord Wellington’s indignant reply to those charges, in a letter to Sir Henry Wellesley, British minister in Spain. Some Spanish party papers went so far as to say that the town was set on lire on purpose by the British, and this insinuation has been repeated by Llorente, in his ‘ JHmoircs de la Rfevolu- tion d'Espagne,’ and by others. “ Everything was done,” says Lord Wellington, “ that was in my power to suggest to save the town. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bombarded, as the most certain SSStSSS4S\.S J bXS — — s mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I jiositively would iipt allow, for the same reasons as I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz to be bombarded Nei- ther is it true that the town was set on fire hy the English and Portuguese troops. 'To set fire to the town was part of the enemy’s defence. It was set on fire by the enemy on the 22nd of July, before the final attempt was made to take it hy storm; and it is a fact that tl|e fire was sg violent on the 24th of July, that the storpi, which wgs to have taken place on thqt day, was necessarily deferred till the 25th, and, as it is well known, failed. I lyas at the siege of St. Sebastian on the 30th of A\i- giist, and I aver that the town was then on fire. It must have beeti set on fire by the enemy, as I repeat that our batteries, by positive order, threw no shells into the town; and 1 saw the town on fire on the 31st of August, before the storm took place. It is well known that the enemy had prepared for a serious resistance, not only on the ramparts, but in the streets of the town; that traverses were established in the streets, formed of combuslihles, with the intention of setting fire to and exploding them during the contest with the assailants. It is equally known that there was a most severe contest in the streets of the town between the assailants and the garrison; that many of these traverses were exploded, by which many lives on both sides were lost; and it is a fact that these explo- sions set fire to many of the houses Everything was done that could be done to extinguish the fire by our own soldiers. In regqrd to the plunder of the town by the sol- diers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every otlicer laments, qot only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on tlie unfortu- nate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to disci- pline. Notwithstanding that I am convinced tliat it is impos- sible to prevent a town in sucb a situation from being plun- dered, 1 can prove that, upon this occasion, particular pains were taken to prevent it 11 it had not been for the file, which certainly augmented the confusion, and atYorded greater facilities for irregularity, and if by far the greater proportion of the officers and non-commissioned officers, particularly ot the principal officers who stormed the breach, had not been killed or wounded in the performance of their duty in tlie ser- vice of Spain, to the number of 170 out of about 250,1 believe Ibat the plunder would have been, in great measure, though not entirely, prevented.”—(* Dispatches,’ xi. pp. 172-4.) The castle of St. Sebastian capitulated after a few days. The siege and capture of the jilace cost the Allies nearly 4000 men, killed and wounded. Three British general officers were wounded, and Sir Richard Fletcher, the commanding officer of engineers, was killed. On the 31st of August, the day of the storm, Soult made an efl'ort to relieve the place. Three divisions of Spaniards, under General Freyre, occupied the left bank of tlie Bidassoa, supported on the right and left by English and Portuguese$