A key to physic, and the occult sciences / [E. Sibly].

  • Sibly, E. (Ebenezer), 1751-1800
Date:
1821
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A key to physic, and the occult sciences / [E. Sibly]. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    17/548 (page 5)
    ing being from eternity. If it be faid, there was a time when that eternal being had no knowledge ; I reply, that then it is impoflible there ihould have ever been any knowledge; it being as impoflible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, Ihould produce a knowing being, as it is impoflible that a triangle Ihould make itfelf three angles bigger than two rirrht ones. Thus, from the confideration of ourfelves, and what we infallibly find in our own conditions, our reafon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, mod powerful, and knowing, being, which whether any one will call God, it matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea, duly confidered, willeafily be deduced all thofe other attributes we ought to afcribe to this eternal Being. From what has been faid, it is plain that we have a more certain knowledge of the exidence of a God than of any thing our fenfes have not immediately difcovered to us. Nay, I prefume I may fay, that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing elfe without us. When I fay, we k?tozv, I mean, there is fuch a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot mifs, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to other enquiries. It being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude, that fomething has exided from eternity, let us next fee what kind of thing that mud: be. There are but two forts of beings in the world, that man knows or conceives: fuch as are purely material without fenfe or perception; and fenfible perceiving beings, fuch as we find ourfelves to be. Thefe two forts we fliali call cogitative and incogitative beings; which, to our prefent purpofe, are better than material and immaterial. If then there mud be fomething eternal, it is very obvious to reafon, that it mud necefiarily be a cogitative being; becaufe it is as impoflible to conceive that bare incogitative matter diould ever produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing of itfelf diould produce matter. Let us fuppofe any parcel of matter eternal, we fhall find it in itfelf unable to produce any thing. Let us fuppofe its parts firmly at red together ; if there were no other being in the world, mud it not eternally re- main fo, a dead unadlive lump? is it poffible to conceive that it can add motion to itfelf, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own drength, cannot produce in itfelf fo much as motion. The motion it has, mud alfo be from eternity, or elfe added to matter by fome other being, more powerful than matter. But let us fup- pofe motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter, and motion, could never produce thought. Knowledge will dill be as far beyond the power of nothing to produce. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will, vary its figure and motion as much as you pleafe, it will operate no otherwife upon other bodies