Volume 1

Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa.

  • Great Britain. Royal Commission on the South African War, 1899-1900
Date:
1903
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    rule, be raised in the neighbourhood. Let them all practice as hard as possible, especially in shooting and getting to know the country. Professedly every ‘such camp should be merely a stationary garrison and training ground. But really it should be so organised that the -rtillery and mounted men, with or without a portion of the infantry, could be off at any moment up or down the line, and within a certain area of country on either side of it, to deal at once with any local trouble, the rest of the infantry remaining to guard the camp. The best localities for such camps would be a matter for careful consideration. I am not by any means sure which would be the best, but, if only to illustrate my idea, I will mention a few possible sites. These are Cradock, Graaf Reinet, the neighbourhood of Hex River, and Carnarvon, but there are a number of others which might be considered. Carnarvon, no doubt, is not on any railway, and, as a rule, it would be better to stick to the main lines ; but, on the other hand, it has always seemed to me that the total absence of any force to the left of the great western trunk-line, the fact that the line itself is, so to speak, our military boundary, without as much as an outpost in front of it, is strate- gically an unsound position. I think, therefore, that one strong post at least should be established well to the west of the line, though whether it should be at Car- narvon, Fraserburg, or some other point in that region, is a question on which I have an open mind. require altogether some 5,000 men and two batteries, while they would enormously strengthen the position in the Colony during the approaching months. And the men stationed in them would all the time be learning their duties, and to know the country. They would thus be growing steadily more efficient to take their places in the front, if wanted todo so. The above may not be the best way of proceeding against the danger I have indicated. If so some other and better plan can doubtless be devised. My object is to direct attention to the matter, so that some system may be decided on for utilising such of the forces which will shortly be arriving, as are not absolutely required at the front, to guard the rest of the country in the most effective manner, and the manner most economical of numbers. If the general lines are laid down, the business could the more important operation to the front, without your being appealed to at every moment about details. If successful, the result should be to leave our main Field Force absolutely free to deal with the enemy in front without anxiety about its lines of railway com- munication or anything in its rear, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from drawing any further support from the Colony. (Sd.) A. M. 4.2.1900. Head Quarters, Cape Town, With reference to the High Commissioner’s memoran- dum, dated 4th February, 1900, on the political and military position of affairs in Cape Colony, and the possible result of offensive action on a large scale in the direction of the Orange Free State, 1 recognise that the force at my disposal does not, at the present moment, admit of the Colony being held as strongly as would otherwise be desirable; and I can understand His Excellency’s feeling of insecurity and his apprehension that the removal of regular troops may encourage the disloyal, and lead to local risings which, if left unchecked, may rapidly spread over a considerable area. On the other hand, it seems unquestionable that the war cannot be brought to an end without prompt and decisive offensive action, and I observe that, in the High Commissioner’s opinion, the longer the war lasts the greater is the danger of rebellion within the limits of the Colony. Unless, moreover, immediate steps are taken for the relief of Kimberley, that place must fall into the enemy’s hands. From the latest reports which I have received it would appear that the garrison cannot hold out beyond the end of the present month, and even now food supplies have to be carefully economised and reduced rations issued to the troops and civil population. Then, again, until Kimberley is relieved, Lord Methuen’s force cannot be used for the general purposes of the campaign, and by operating through the Orange Free State I hope not onlv to extricate that force and to relieve Kimberley, but aiso to iessen the hostile pressure on Ladysmith, and enable Sir Redvers Buller to join hands with Sir George White. A serious rising in the Cape Colony is a problematical danger, while the fall of Kimberley and Ladysmith, which is inevitable unless those places can be relieved at an early date, would produce a far-reaching effect not only on the inhabitants of South Africa, but on the prestige of the British Army and on the prospects of the war. I am convinced that our only chance of striking a decisive blow is to carry the war into the enemy’s country, and that action of this nature must necessarily lessen the risk of internai disaffection, inasmuch as, if the Boers are fully occupied in opposing our field army, they will be unable to render assistance to rebels in the Cape Colony, and without such assistance, as Sir Alfred Milner remarks. local risings are unlikely to occur, or, if they do occur, to be of a formidable description. The High Commissioner thinks that the stoppage in the influx of fresh troops, combined with the withdrawal o° troops for field operations,/will encourage the di‘s- would observe that, exclusive of the force which is being concentrated for offensive action on the Western railway line, every available man is being employed to and Eastern lines of communication. Reinforcements. are arriving from England and the Colonies, and will continue to do so throughout the current month. No less than 15 batteries of Field Artillery and two com panies of Garrison Artillery will reach Cape Town between the present date and the 19th instant. Artillery is also coming from New South Wales, Canada, and New Zealand. In addition to the City ]mperial Volunteers, a large body of Yeomanry is being despatched from home, and Mounted Infantry from almost every Colony as well as India. The three Field Batteries which are expected on February 8th will go to the Orange River and De Aar ; and the two Field Batteries and two Garrison Com- panies which are expected on the 12th will be allotted to Cape Town and the lines of communication ; the two Field Batteries which are expected on the 13th will be quartered at Naauwpoort for service towards the Eastern Railway line: and of the five Field Batteries which are expected on the 18th, two will be sent to the Orange River, and three to East London to strengthen General Gatacre. Three Howitzer Batteries arriving the fol- lowing day will be sent to Naauwpoort for any service that may be required. The Colonial and City Imperial Artillery will be placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Lines of Communication. Six more Militia battalions are expected in the course of this month, and I have asked that additional battalions may be sent out with the least possible delay. These troops will be available to strengthen the garrison of the Colony, which, by the end of this month, will be augmented to the extent of at least 10,000 men. It will be seen, therefore, that Sir Alfred Milner is mistaken in supposing that the influx of troops is about to cease, and as regards the unnecessary risk to which he alludes, T can only say that, so far as the means at my disposal will allow, I am as anxious to provide for the summary repression of rebellion within the Colony as to defeat the enemy outside the Colony. If I succeed in attaining the latter object, I shall go far towards securing the former, but the converse does not hold good. For this reason I consider it a sounder policy to incur some slight risk of internal disturbance than for the purpose of avoiding such a risk to abandon Kimberley, or endeavour to relieve it with an insufficient force. ; With respect to the High Commissioner’s remarks. on the location and mobility of the Colonial garrisons