A collection of papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 relating to the principles of natural philosophy and religion / [In French and English] With an appendix. To which are added letters to Dr. Clarke concerning liberty and necessity; from a gentleman of the University of Cambridge [J. Bulkeley]: with the Doctor's answers to them. Also remarks upon a book entituled A philosophical enquiry concerning human liberty [by A. Collins] By Samuel Clarke.

Samuel Clarke

Date:: 1717

Credit: A collection of papers which passed between the late learned Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 relating to the principles of natural philosophy and religion / [In French and English] With an appendix. To which are added letters to Dr. Clarke concerning liberty and necessity; from a gentleman of the University of Cambridge [J. Bulkeley]: with the Doctor's answers to them. Also remarks upon a book entituled A philosophical enquiry concerning human liberty [by A. Collins] By Samuel Clarke. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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[ »?] not but produce that Motion or A3 ion, of which it is at that time the immediate efficient Caufe. If I miftske not therefore, This Ar¬ gument (in the True Intent and Meaning of the Author) is entirely founded upon the Suppofttion, that there neither is nor can be in Nature any luch thing as a Self-moving Power at all- For, What elfe is the Meaning of his affirming, that, if Mans Actions are not Eeceffary, (that is, if they be not ployfically and efficiently caufed by mechanical Imputfe of Matter, which is making them to be mere Pallions and not Addons at all • or by Reafons and Motives, which is making Reafons and Motives to be phyfical Agents or Subftancesy) then cc a thing can have a Beginning, whicbPa&'$7* “ has no Caufe f and, “ Nothing can produce “ Something?' And when he tells us, that cc rf Any Aion whatfoever can he don eftN ith-q2 cc out a Caufe, then Effects and Cat ifis have <c no necceffary relation, and by confequence cc we (Jjould not be nece ft arily determined in “ Any cafe at all ft And that, “ if in theP*&• 82 “ mo ft indifferent things there was not a cc Caufe of Choice, but a Choice could “ be made without a Caufe, then All Choices “ might be made without a Caufe, and eve u fhould not be neceffarily determined by the “ greatejl Evidence to Affent to Truth : v> What is this, but Sitppofng that there is no fuch tning in nature as a Self-moving Power^ and that if every Action and Choice he not as neccffiarily determined by fomething over which

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