The theory of the earth: containing an account of the original of the earth, and of all the general changes which it hath already undergone, or is to undergo, till the consummation of all things. The two first books, concerning the deluge and concerning paradise / [Thomas Burnet].
- Burnet, Thomas, Sir, 1632?-1715?
- Date:
- 1684
Licence: Public Domain Mark
Credit: The theory of the earth: containing an account of the original of the earth, and of all the general changes which it hath already undergone, or is to undergo, till the consummation of all things. The two first books, concerning the deluge and concerning paradise / [Thomas Burnet]. Source: Wellcome Collection.
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![cation betwixt thefe two fubftances for a time, vi%. during the Vitality of the Body. 'Tis true indeed, if Thought, Apprehenfion, and Reafon, was nothing but Corporeal Motion, this Ar¬ gument would be of no force 5 but to fuppofe this, is to admit an abfurdity to cure a difficulty 3 to make a Thought out of a local Motion, is like making a God out of a Stock, or a Stone 3 for thefe two are as remote in their Nature, and have as different Idea s in the Mind, as any two difparate things we can pro- pofe or conceive 3 Number and Colour, a Triangle and Vertue, Free-will and a Pyramid are not more unlike, more diftant, or of more different forms than Thought and local Adotion. Motion is nothing but a Bodies changing its place and fituation amongft other Bodies, and what affinity or refemblance hath that to a Thought ? how is that like to Pain, or to a doubt, of the Mind ? to Hope or to Defire ? to the Idea of God ? to any act of the Will or Undeman¬ ding, as judging, contenting, reafoning, remembring, or any other ? Thefe are things of leveral orders, that have no fimilitude, nor any mixture of one another. And as this is the nature of Motion, fo on the other hand in a Thought there are two things, Confcioufnefs, and a Reprefent&tion 3 Confcioufnefs is mail Thoughts indifferently, whether diftind or confus’d, for no man thinks but he is confcious that he thinks, nor per¬ ceives any thing but he is confcious that he perceives it 3 there is alfo in a Thought, efpecially if it be di- ftind, a reprefentation 3 Tis the image of that we think upon, and makes its Objed prefent to the Mind. Now what hath local Motion to do with either of thefe two, Confcioufnefs, or Reprefentativenefs ? how doth it include either of them, or hold them any wav affixt to its Nature ? I think one may with as good fence and reafon ask of what colour a Thought is, green or fcarlet, as what fort of Motion it is 3 for Motion of what fort foever, can never be confcious, nor reprefent things as our Thoughts do. 1 have no¬ ted thus much in genera], only to fhow the different nature ol Motion and Cogitation, that we may be the more fenfible that they have no mutual connexion in](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b3032483x_0334.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
