The legal doctrine of responsibility in relation to insanity / by S.W. North.

  • North, S. W.
Date:
[1864?]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The legal doctrine of responsibility in relation to insanity / by S.W. North. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    10/16 page 10
    could quote the authority of men from every country in Europe in support of it; this is not necessary, I do not believe anyone will ven¬ ture to question the fact. I cannot, however, forbear quoting the words of an eminent writer on this subject. “ It may also be asserted, as the result of observation and ex¬ perience, that in all lunatics, and even in the most degraded idiots, whenever manifestations of any mental action can be educed, the feeling of right and wrong may be proved to exist. The education of idiots and cretins has proved that there is no zero in the human mind; and the success of the moral treatment prevailing in lunatic asylums has demonstrated that insanity does not neutralise the influences by which the moral government of the world is effected. But if insanity does not remove these innate principles, does it on that account leave persons under their influence wholly responsible for their actions ? Certainly not. Responsibility depends upon power, not upon knowledge, still less upon feeling. A man is responsible to do that which he can do, not that which he feels or knows it right to do. If a man is reduced under thraldom to passion by disease of the brain, he loses moral freedom and responsibility, although his knowledge of right and wrong may remain intact.” * The whole error, and the secret of all the confusion that has arisen lies in the fact, that the doctrine of responsibility has been educed from a consideration of what holds good in a state of perfect sanity and integrity of the faculties, without any reference to, or observation of, the condition of insane persons in this particular. The opinion of the judges is doubtless a reflex of their own self-consciousness, but contains no element derived from observation of disease. It now only remains for me to say a few words on the nature of insanity, and to seek therefrom on theoretical grounds to establish my conclusion that knowledge is a faculty apart from volition. Of the nature of the thinking principle, that by which man be¬ comes a moving power in the world, we know nothing beyond the fact that it is associated with a nervous system, upon the integrity of which it is dependent for its healthy manifestation. This nervous system we know to be compounded of various parts or centres, each having a distinct function, motion, sensation, perception, and that something we call reason. In a state.of health these parts and their functions are all mutually associated, working together in the production of any act, and obeying that force which we call will. This intimate blending, intricate co-operation, and mutual dependency, which the various parts preserve towards one another, must be carefully distin¬ guished from their integral unity ; for although in a state of health they all co-operate in the production of the acts which characterise our daily life, it does not follow but that under altered circumstances they may become dissociated, separated from each other, and removed from the control of the will, thereby giving rise to the phenomena which are peculiarly characteristic of insanity. That this dissociation
    digitised image 1
    digitised image 2
    digitised image 3