Licence: In copyright
Credit: The mind of man : a text-book of psychology / by Gustav Spiller. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh. The original may be consulted at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.
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![With no understanding, or next to none, of actual structure, the secondary means would be of less than doubtful value. Vague and diffuse observations would of necessity be followed by vague and diffuse conclusions. So with psychology. In the absence of a power of self-observation, advance would be barred, for secondary means can only be helpful when the primary approach is not virtually closed. If a direct approach be im- practicable, we shall be compelled to rest satisfied with vague hints. Yet, taking a broad view, our aim is to ascertain the whole edifice of thought by experimentally looking within, or, as it is called, by introspection. Not until this approach is found to be demonstrably inaccessible like the centre of the earth is now, may we think of applying other methods. Most thinkers have, however, despaired of obtaining a satisfactory peep into the thought jungle, and have consequently advocated secondary means of attaining their object. One of these means which Herbart eloquently advocated, the use of hypotheses, I have already examined and rejected. The others are as follows: retrospectio7i; the comparative study of children^ races, anunals, criminals, the hisane, hypnotised and diseased persons; as zvell as the examina- tion of products such as facial expressions, mo?iuments or books. As I believe that introspection is eminently practicable, I consider the other means to be of secondary importance, and shall refer to them only incidentally, if at all. 4.—Introspection. The difficulties of introspection were insisted on at an early date by Hume : “It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity ] nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation ; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection'’ {Inquiry, 1747, sec. i. See also Hume’s Introduction to his Treatise on Human Nature). If the objects “ must be apprehended in an instant,” reasonable observation is out of the question ; but we are convinced that absence of adequate introspective training accounted for Hume’s opinion. To one hypothesis we owe almost the entire neglect of introspection. Auguste Comte (d. 1857) maintained that “the affective functions, and yet more the intellectual, exhibit .... this particular characteristic, that they cannot be observed during their operation, but only in their results” {Positive Philosophy, 1875, T., i, p. 382). This belief, never thoroughly tested, pervades most criticism. Herbart* {Psychologic, i, p. 206), says: “ Do you intend to observe yourself passively, so as to clearly perceive what is ^ *For accounts of Herbart and Herbartians, see Stout, The Herbartian Psychology, 1SS8; : Stout, Herbart compared with the Et?glish Psychologists, 1S89; Stout, Herbart's Disciples 1 1889; Ward, article “Herbart,” in Enc. Brit., 1886; La Psychologic de Herbcut 1 1876. See also my account of Herbart in sec. 80. ’](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21938982_0035.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
