Licence: In copyright
Credit: The mind of man : a text-book of psychology / by Gustav Spiller. Source: Wellcome Collection.
Provider: This material has been provided by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh. The original may be consulted at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.
38/578 page 18
![spection. James, in his characteristic style, says with regard to thoughts and feelings: “Whilst alive they are their own property; it is oxA'j post- ' mortem that they become his [the psychologist’s] prey” {Psychology, 1890, i, p. 189). And Baldwin: “All our mental states are rendered more / intense by the attention: consequently as soon as the state observed comes within the range of fruitful observation, it is changed, both in its v, own integrity and in its relative importance in the mental life” {Senses and , Intellect, 1890, p. 10). So Titchener: “Direct introspection—observation of a process which is still running its course—is, as a matter of fact, en- ■; tirely worthless; it defeats its own object” {An Outline of Psychology, 1896, ■; P- 33)- _ _ _ \ Egger, in a dissertation on internal speech, pronounces against intro- '( spection and for retrospection. “ Instead of observing directly our present condition,” he says, “let us interrogate our memory” {la Parole Intkrieure, 1881, p. 79). Paulhan {La Perception hiterne et la Psychologic, 1888) sails round the subject, enlarging upon the possibilities of error. Ribot {Psychology of the Emotions, 1897) speaks of introspection, “always an uncertain guide which leads us but a little way ” (p. vi). The army of the faithful is very small. Lewes {The Study of Psychology, 1879) seems to support the possibility of introspection unconditionally. Ladd and Miinsterberg are, generally speaking, favourable. The former sensibly remarks that “ the risks, limitations, possibilities, and proper uses :: of introspection in psychology can only be made known in connection with . the development of the science itself” {Psychology, 1894, p. 15), while the latter rightly urges that talent, training and appropriate know- , ledge are requisite {Ueber Aufgaben, 1891). Yet, however, in another \ place Miinsterberg writes: “To direct the attention, or the will, to our ^ volitions, would mean the possession of a doubled self-consciousness, and ' is, therefore, a complete inner contradiction. Psychological analysis is, in consequence, restricted to the memory pictures of inner processes ” {Die , Willenshandlung, 1888, p. 57). Lipps {Gnmdtatsachen, 1883, pp. 10-1) rebuts the attacks on self-inspection in a general way. Beneke holds views ; as strong as mine, though one cannot detect any attempt at realising those , views: “ As for the objection that self-observation is impossible, it can be made only by those who have never seriously set themselves the task” . {Neue Psychologic, 1845, p. 15. See also the preface to Beneke’s Lehrbuch, 1845). So Robertson {Elements of Psychology, 1896, p. 14) says : “Without making light of the difficulties attending introspection, we may therefore , rest satisfied that there is no reason why it should not, when properly conducted, lead to results of a purely scientific character.” But this is a . mere theoretical plea. Similarly Bailey {Letters, i855‘fi3)> especially in his Third Series, pp. 1-13, argues in favour of introspection as against Comte. No application, however, is made by Bailey of the introspective method. We have heard the witnesses for and against. Almost without exception, • the testimony, directly or by implication, against introspection is crushing.](https://iiif.wellcomecollection.org/image/b21938982_0038.jp2/full/800%2C/0/default.jpg)
