Outlines of a philosophical argument on the infinite, and the final cause of creation; and on the intercourse between the soul and the body / by Emanuel Swedenborg. Translated from the Latin by James John Garth Wilkinson.

  • Emmanuel Swedenborg
Date:
1847
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Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Outlines of a philosophical argument on the infinite, and the final cause of creation; and on the intercourse between the soul and the body / by Emanuel Swedenborg. Translated from the Latin by James John Garth Wilkinson. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    indeed may exist in man, but naturally speaking by no means superlative perfection, which may be manifested in the primitive alone, and nowhere else. § XIV. God has exercised We shall now be asked how the divine end his prevision and can be obtained, unless the last effect of nature RAE duelo] be similar to the first? For if the divine end the primary end. is to be obtained through the finite, it cannot possibly be obtained, unless by the constant presence of a super- lative perfection in the whole series, causing all things to con- spire to this divine and infinite end. Not, however, to moot this question at present, though it must come before us shortly, we may observe that at any rate all the means cannot conspire to the above end, unless they too are similar in perfection to the first principle: and here suffice it to say that naturally aem this is impossible. The infinite could not but foreknow this, and as the end was divine and infinite, could not but at the same time provide to meet it. For as the end is infinite, and as God is infinite, so his foreknowledge—his PrEvVIDENcE—cannot be distinguished from his PROVIDENCE, but the two are one and the same to the mind: in fact, were they divided, we should at once come into the sphere of the finite. Therefore foreknowledge and provi- dence were present together to obtain this end. Let us see then what was the nature of this combined or identified previ- dence and providence; which we may now do in a finite manner from the effect or a posteriori. For as the corporeal part of man could not possibly be the superlative perfection of finite existence, being so low im the series of derivations, and so distant from the perfection of the primitive; and as Deity foreknew this condition arising out of the finiteness of the sub- ject—foreknew that the body or the last effect could not have the above perfection ;—therefore he at once provided for the case by the creation of the soul, which he made rational, and con- summately rational, and indeed most perfect, so that it might rule the body, A soul that should have dominion over all parts of the body at once. A soul without which the body could do