Volume 182303

The works of William Paley / [William Paley].

  • William Paley
Date:
1823
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: The works of William Paley / [William Paley]. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    out of possible combinations of material forms; tha whatever he had found in the place where he found ths watch, must have contained some internal configuratioy or other; and that this configuration might be thi structure now exhibited, viz, of the works of a watch, a: wellas a differentstructure ; V. Nor, fifthly, would it yield his inquiry more sa tisfaction to be answered, that there existed in thing: a principle of order, which had disposed the parts o. the watch into their present form and situation. Hé never knew a watch made by the principle of order r nor can he even form to himself an idea of what is meant by a principle of order, distinct from the intel. ligence of the watchmaker. VI. Sixthly, he would be surprised to hear that the mechanism of the watch was no proof of contrivance, only a motive to induce the mind to think so, 4 VII. And notless surprised to be informed, that the: watch in his hand was nothing more than the result of the laws of metallic nature, It is a perversion of lan- guage to assign any law, as the efficient, operatives cause of any thing. A law presupposes an agent ; for it is only the mode, according to which an agent pro- - ceeds ; it implies a power ; forit is the order, according ¢ to which that power acts. Without this agent, without ¢ this power, which are both distinct from itself, the Zaw y does nothing ; is nothing. The expression, “ the law: of metalic nature,” may sound strange and harsh to» a philosophic ear ; but it seems quite as justifiable as ; some others which are more familiar to him, such as : “* the law of vegetable nature,” “ the law of animal na- ture,” or indeed as “ the law of nature,” in general, _ when assigned as the cause of phenomena, in exclusion _ of agency and power; or when it is substituted into the. place of these. | . MITT. Neither, lastly, would our observer be driven out of his conclusion, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knows nothing at all about the matter.- He knows enough for his argument: he knows the utility of the end ; he knows the subservi- eney and” adaptation of the means to the end. These. , points. being known, his ignorance of other points, his
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