Celebrated trials of all countries, and remarkable cases of criminal jurisprudence / Selected by a member of the Philadelphia bar [i.e. J.J. Smith].

  • John Jay Smith
Date:
1835
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: Celebrated trials of all countries, and remarkable cases of criminal jurisprudence / Selected by a member of the Philadelphia bar [i.e. J.J. Smith]. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    that to constitute the crime of high-treason, it was necessary that the guilt should exist in the mind ; and the evidence he adduced was meant to prove this intent by the overt acts, disclaiming any recourse to constructive accu- mulation, or any other kind of treason. The charge against the prisoner was, by overt acts, attempting to over- throw the king's government by force, and thus conspiring his death. But before they could convict him of such offence, they must be satisfied that force was to have been employed. Upon this point he cited the authority of Hale, that when a man conspires the death of the king, or his imprisonment, to gather company, or send letters in execution thereof, is an overt act of high- treason ; but the overt act itself was not high-treason. It could go no farther than to prove the treasonable intention. In the present case, the attorney-general had done all that he was entitled to do, and could prove no more than what was already before the jury; yet there was not the slightest evidence of any design being formed against the king's person, however the proceedings might be thought to operate against the government; and upon that ground he must insist that the proof most completely failed. The convention at Edinburgh, which was the great ground- work of the charge, was evidently assembled for the purpose of deliberating on the means of reforming the abuses in government, and the representation of the people in parliament, without the least intention of accomplishing the object by force. He was happy, on this occasion, to have that authority, which of all others was most desirable; namely, that of the lord chief-justice Eyre himself, in his charge to the grand jury, to show that, whether the proceedings of the societies or the convention led to the death of his majesty or not, was not a matter of inference, but a matter of fact, upon which the jury was to decide. Nothing in the proceedings or publications of either breathed any such ten- dency ; and the same learned judge had told them that no man was justi- fiable in applying to the language of another any other meaning than that which he professed. By the statute of 25 Edward III. it was expressly provided, that no matter of implication should go to a jury on a charge of this nature, but that the prisoner must be provably attainted. He would then ask what were the proofs brought in support of this prosecution] Lord Hale said, that such charges should not be made out by inference or stretches of wit; neither would he attempt to defend his client by wit, if he possessed any. Before so grave a bench and on so solemn an occasion, all appearance of levity would be indecorous, otherwise there was no part of this evidence which was not open to the broadest ridicule. What was become of the humane character of the British law, if the life of a subject was to depend upon evidence too light to pluck a feather from a sparrow's wing, and which would not be admissible in a law-suit respecting £.10. If the jury, after hearing him in the present address, should think it neces- sary to go into any farther evidence, he would prove to them, that major Oartwriijfht, a gentleman of the first character, talents, and respectability in the kingdom, was its original founder. It had for its object a parliamentary reform, an object, for the attainment of which the society of the Friends of the People was since instituted; an object by which the greatest and best men of the country hoped to prevent unnecessary and ruinous wars ; to remedy the abuses in the state; to prevent the increase of taxes, and guard against the profligate expenditure of our money. It was an object which the late earl of Chatham always had at heart, and which formed a leading fea- ture of his character. The duke of Richmond, whose authority in the country was deservedly high, and who was a man not to be suspected of taking up opinions on light or trivial grounds, had not only expressed himself an advocate for a radical reform in the representation, but published a letter, in which he declared it