The life and letters of Herbert Spencer / by David Duncan.

  • David Duncan
Date:
1908
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: The life and letters of Herbert Spencer / by David Duncan. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    625/692 (page 575)
    is to be conceived as a certain aspect of evolving conduct, was utterly alien to current ethical ideas, at the same time that it was congruous with the ideas contained in the preceding works. The tap-root of the system goes back to Social Statics, in which some root-fibres went into Biology, Psychology, and, largely, into Sociology. These fibres had now developed into branch roots, as is shown by the titles of successive chapters—“The Physical View,” “The Biological View,” “The Psychological View,” “ The Sociological View.” Ethics was thus conceived as treating of conduct in relation to physical activities, vital processes, and mental functions, as well as in relation to the wants and actions of surrounding men. Hence not only duty to others, but also duty to self, had to be recognized and emphasized. After these and other Data came the question—What are the Inductions ? Under this head had to be ranged the various kinds of conduct, and the various ideas of right and wrong, found in human societies of all kinds and in all stages of progress. The first general conclusion drawn from this Com- parative Ethics was that there is, in each case, an adaptation between the ideas of right and wrong and the kind of life which inherited nature and environing conditions produce ; and the second conclusion was that there exists no such thing as a moral sense common to all mankind, but that the moral sense in each society, and in each stage, adjusts itself to the conditions. Part III. dealing with “ The Ethics of Individual Life,” recognized, in pursuance of the general conception, the moral sanction of all those individual activitjes implied in the healthful and pleasurable pursuit of personal ends, bodily and mental. The conclusions drawn, though checked by Biology and Psycho- logy, were in the main empirical ; for there are no adequate data on which to base a definite code of private conduct. Personal nature must largely determine the special activities and special limits to them, though vital laws must regulate these. But there is named, though not adequately emphasized, a general consideration furnishing much guidence ; namely, that to achieve the fullest life and greatest happiness, a due pro- portion must be maintained among the activities of the vaiious faculties : excess in one and deficiency in another being, by implication, negatived. Doubtless, in our social life the sub- division of occupations necessitates great disproportion ; but consciousness of the normal proportion serves to restrain. In “The Ethics of Social Life—Justice,” there is at length a return to the topic with which the whole series of my writings commenced. In “The proper Sphere of Government, and then in Social Statics, endeavours were made to reach definite ideas concerning the just regulation of private conduct and the just relations of individuals to the social aggregate, lepiesentec by its government. And now, after all the exploiations made