Intuitive perception : presented by a new philosophy of natural realism, in accord with universally accepted truths / by William Henry Hodge.

  • Hodge, William Henry.
Date:
1903
Catalogue details

Licence: In copyright

Credit: Intuitive perception : presented by a new philosophy of natural realism, in accord with universally accepted truths / by William Henry Hodge. Source: Wellcome Collection.

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    ®fi>es Difference ratber tban Sameness in reliability, and in regard to our confidence in them. They are, moreover, actually changing by new additions, and confusion of one with another; and, old thoughts are often mistaken for new, and new often regarded as those with which we have long been familiar. It is, therefore, a delusion to suppose, that we can, by comparing our present self with anything in the past, positively affirm that they are identical. We can only affirm, with more or less confidence, or hesitancy, some degree of resemblance; and we may be, and often are al- together wrong. By what possibility can I, upon comparing the con- cept which I have of a little boy, and that which I have of a man, such as I now am, affirm the identity of the two persons? There may never have been such a little boy, the particular concept, with which I am comparing myself, may be a mistake. As far as comparison and judgment are concerned, it is difference, not sameness, that is revealed. The judgment, as the result of the comparison is, that the remembered self is different and extremely different from the present self. If with Dr. McCosh, we affirm that we remember the concept as an experience of self, comparison, and judgment are pre- cluded. Memory is every thing and all-sufficient. I simply know that, I, who now am, am the same that I was, because Memory assures me that the concept of the past, which it presents, is a concept of mine own self. Thus Personal Identity becomes a mere uncertain, frag- mentary experience. Its proof is cumulative; it is de- rived from a series of remembrances of a more, or less doubtful character; the longer the series the greater the proof. It is not a necessary truth, and has no reference to the forgotten past, nor to the unknown future Whatever may be true of Memory, as an actual im- pression made, as Dr. McCosh seems to think, indelibly