On the voluntary and instinctive actions of living beings / by William B. Carpenter.

  • Carpenter, William Benjamin, 1813-1885.
Date:
[1837]
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: On the voluntary and instinctive actions of living beings / by William B. Carpenter. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by The University of Glasgow Library. The original may be consulted at The University of Glasgow Library.

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    correspond (to say the least) with their manifestation. I shall ] endeavour, therefore, to trace the successive complication of the ' chain of causes and effects in the actions performed by animals, reasoning rather from below upwards, than from above down- wards ; since it appears to me that animals of the inferior or- - ders (especially those now included in the division Acrita) bear much more resemblance to vegetables in the totality of their vi- tal actions, than to the higher members of their own kingdom. It is necessary that, before proceeding farther, I should spe- cify the sense in which I am about to employ certain terms to which different authors have attached a great variety of mean- ings. These terms relate to the process by which the thinking mind takes cognizance of the qualities of external objects; a pro- 1 cess which, though apparently simple, is resolvable into many- steps, each of which has its appropriate designation. In the first place, an impression is produced upon the organ of sense by its appropriate stimulus, and this impression is propagated along the nerve which connects it with the sensorium commune. We are justified in regarding the formation and propagation of this im- pression as a strictly corporeal function, although we cannot trace the organic change of the nervous system by which it is accompanied. * This impression conveyed to the sensorium gives rise to that mental change which is termed sensation^ which may be regarded as the passive reception by the mind of the im- pression made upon the organ of sense, which thus communicates to it the simple notion of the presence of an external object. For this change to take place, let it be observed, consciousness is all that is requisite ; and if consciousness exist, and the nervous communication be perfect, sensation must follow an impression. The mental change termed perception may or may not follow ac- cording as the attention is directed to the sensation; and this change consists in the formation of a notion of the qualities of the external object, derived by inference from the sensation. '. The first stage of the process is therefore purely corporeal; the I third purely mental; the second is the stage of transition by which I the body communicates with the mind. Now for each of these steps in the action of the body on the mind, I think that a corresponding step may be traced in the re- ciprocal action of the mind upon the body. Before a perception can occasion any corporeal change, it must have given rise to va- rious mental processes, such as association, judgment, &c. with the nature of which we have at present nothing to do. These, however, all terminate in the formation of a volition, which may I thmk be regarded as a strictly mental act.f and as holding a ' Prichard on the Vital Principle, p. 147. t Koget's Physiology, Vol. ii. p. 535, note.