A first book in psychology / by Mary Whiton Calkins.

  • Mary Whiton Calkins
Date:
1910
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A first book in psychology / by Mary Whiton Calkins. Source: Wellcome Collection.

    395/446 page 377
    Will § i. In support of the teaching, contrary to that of this book, that there is a volition or conation element, cf. G. T. Ladd, Psy¬ chology, Descriptive and Explanatory, 1895, pp. 211 ff. Readers of my earlier book, “An Introduction to Psychology,” will notice that I have abandoned the use of the term ‘ volition ’ to designate exclusively the anticipatory image regarded from the standpoint of the idea-psychologist. In this book volition is used as a synonym for ‘will.’ § 2. Professor Thorndike opposes the conception of volition as anticipatory imagination on the ground that actions may be, and often are, performed without any antecedent image of them. “Any mental state whatever,” he says, “may be an impulse,— may take on the aspect of impeller to an act” ;* and he adds that “percepts, sensations, and emotions” more than “images and memories” impel action.* All this, doubtless, is true. Pro¬ fessor Thorndike rightly suggests that even an exhortation to choice, such as “Make up your mind,” may in actual fact result in an impulsive act and not in an act preceded by anticipatory image. Yet it does not follow that because an act may be impulsively performed, therefore volition is identical with impulse. The truth is that there are two sorts of ideo-motor act: the more common impulsive movement which Thorndike describes, and the strictly voluntary act. A given action may be performed either impulsively or voluntarily — either without, or with, an¬ ticipatory consciousness. * Elements of Psychology, pp. 86 ff. Cf. R. S. Woodworth, “The Cause of a Voluntary Movement,” Garman Commemorative Volume, pp. 351 ff.
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