A new theory of knowing and known : with some speculations on the border-land of psychology and physiology / by John Cunningham.

Date:
1874
Catalogue details

Licence: Public Domain Mark

Credit: A new theory of knowing and known : with some speculations on the border-land of psychology and physiology / by John Cunningham. Source: Wellcome Collection.

Provider: This material has been provided by the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh. The original may be consulted at the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh.

    18/216 page 2
    very curious logical puzzles—like Zeno's proof of the impossi- bility of motion, or the demonstration that the swift-footed Achilles could never overtake a slow-footed tortoise, if the tortoise had a start of but ten yards of him—they can be nothing more. There must be a fallacy somewhere, though it may be difficult to detect it. Thus almost all philosophers, ancient and modern together, have shown convincingly (but who has believed them ]) that nothing exists in the universe but—nothing. And this metaphysical dogma has recently been modified by another, equally well demonstrated, that something and nothing, existence and non-existence, are pre- cisely the same ; and thus our universe has been restored to us, or at least left in the limbo which forms the debatable land between somethingness and nothingness. I ventuTe to think there must be something radically wrong with a philosophy which has led to such conclusions, for philosophy should simply be the expression of the highest reason, and all reason revolts at these results. Np man but a metaphysician believes the doctrines which metaphysicians have proved, and it may be doubted whether metaphysicians believe them themselves. And while it may be said, and has been said, that the metaphysician alone is the proper judge of such matters, every man wiU nevertheless presume to think for himself in regard to his own existence and the existence of the world around him. He cannot help having certain thoughts and beliefs in regard to such matters ; and when the metaphysician finds himself in conflict with all mankind, this should lead him, at any rate, to reconsider both his premises and his conclusion, if not to reflect that he has placed himself in antagonism to the universal consciousness, which must be the ultimate arbiter of truth. It is true the common herd may err through ignorance, or prejudice, or passion, but the most learned are not altogether exempt from these failings of humanity, and it is just possible
    digitised image 1
    digitised image 2
    digitised image 3